Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'What is so bad about Contradictions?' and 'Euthydemus'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in.
     From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3
     A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 301a)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
     Full Idea: If there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 289b)
     A reaction: I take this to be not a gormless utilitarianism about knowledge, but a plea for holism, that knowledge only has value as part of some larger picture. The big view is the important view. He's wrong, though. Work out the use later.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
     Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 294c)
     A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
     Full Idea: What knowledge would enable us to live finely for the rest of our lives?
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 293a)
     A reaction: A successful grasp of other people's points of view might lead to respect for them. Also a realisation that we are not isolated individuals. We really are all in it together.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
     Full Idea: Nothing is good except knowledge of some sort.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 292b)
     A reaction: I've heard it suggested that truth is the only value. This is the Socratic idea that moral goodness is a matter of successful rational judgement. Not convinced, but interesting.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
     Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 306a)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').