Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason' and 'Moral Philosophy meets social psychology'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

10 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
5062 First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We rise to metaphysics by saying 'nothing takes place without a reason', then asking 'why is there something rather than nothing?, and then 'why do things exist as they do?'
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §7)
     A reaction: Wonderful. This is what we pay philosophers for - to attempt to go to the heart of the mystery, and then start formulating the appropriate questions. The question of 'why this?' is the sweetest question. The first one seems a little intractable.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
19377 A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4)
     A reaction: Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
19353 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4)
     A reaction: The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
5061 Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5)
     A reaction: This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
5063 Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Music charms us although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §17)
     A reaction: 'Only'! This is a super-pythagorean view of music, as you might expect from a great mathematician. Did he understand the horrible compromises that had just been made to achieve even-tempered tuning? Patterns are the key, as always.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
5122 Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman]
     Full Idea: Consequentialism may be put forward not as an attempt to capture intuitive folk morality but rather as a critique of ordinary tuitions.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.1)
     A reaction: It is certainly true that most people are concerned with why an action was performed, and (after initial anger) are prepared to forgive an unintended disaster. We have no moral objections to earthquakes, which have bad consequences.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
5123 Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman]
     Full Idea: It may be the case that there is no such thing as character, no ordinary character traits of the sort people think there are, none of the usual moral virtues and vices.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.1)
     A reaction: This would be a devastating fact for virtue theory, if it were true. I don't believe it. He thinks patterns of behaviour result from circumstances, but we give accurate and detailed pictures of people's characters (esp. in novels).
5124 If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman]
     Full Idea: If Herbert is disposed to not speak in history class (but not other subjects), and explanation of this is different from his avoidance of roller coaster rides, then these two dispositions are not special cases of a single character trait.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.2)
     A reaction: A basic Harman argument for denying the existence of character (and hence of virtues). I just say that character traits are more complex than his caricature of them. If I keep imagining disaster and humiliation for myself, that is a character trait.
5125 Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman]
     Full Idea: There are variants of virtue ethics that do not require character traits in the ordinary sense. For example, moral thinking might be explicated by appeal to judgements about whether particular actions are just or courageous or whatever.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Moral Philosophy meets social psychology [1999], 10.7.1.1)
     A reaction: A very interesting proposal (from Judith Jarvis Thomson). This would flatly reject Aristotle, and one presumes that the judgement about the virtue of the action would largely be a matter of pondering cultural conventions (or, perhaps, consequences).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').