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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Can there be Vague Objects?' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori, and not from the order of the phenomena alone. ... For the senses put nothing forward concerning metaphysical matters.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Nice instance of the aspirations of big metaphysics, before Kant cut it down to size. The claim is not far off Plato's, that by dialectic we can work out the necessities of the Forms, to which even the gods must bow. Are necessities really kept from us?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If that substantial chain [vinculum substantiale] for monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, continual dreams perfectly in agreement.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
     A reaction: [The first appearance, apparently, of the 'susbtantial chain' in his writings] I take this to be a hugely significant move, either a defeat for monads, or the arrival of common sense. Spiritual monads must unify things, so they can't just be 'parallel'.
12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Monads do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they make up, not something one per se, but only a mere aggregate, unless some substantial chain is added.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.05.26)
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement in the Des Bosses letters of the need for something extra to unite monads. Since the main role of monads was to replace substances, which are only postulated to provide unity, this is rather a climb-down.
12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Monads aren't a principle of operation for things outside of themselves.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: This is why Leibniz has got into a tangle, and is proposing his 'substantial chain' to join the monads together. I suspect that he would have dumped monads if he had lived a bit longer.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed)
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3
     A reaction: A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved.
16459 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
     Full Idea: Maybe the world is vague, and vagueness is a necessary feature of any true description of it. Also identities may lack a determinate truth value because of their vagueness. Hence it is a fact that some objects have fuzzy boundaries. But is this coherent?
     From: Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978])
     A reaction: [compressed] Lewis quotes this introduction to the famous short paper, to show that Evans wasn't proposing a poor argument, but offering a reductio of the view that vagueness is 'ontic', or a feature of the world.
16460 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
     A reaction: [Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'.
16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
     A reaction: Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not say there is a chain midway between matter and form, but that the substantial form and primary matter of the composite, in the Scholastic sense (the primitive power, active and passive) are in the chain, and in the essence of the composite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Note that this implies an essence of primitive power, and not just a collection of all properties. This is the clearest account in these letters of the nature of the 'substantial chain' he has added to his monads.
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The first entelechy of a composite is a constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive force.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: For me, Leibniz's most interesting proposal is to characterise Aristotelian 'form' as an active thing, which offers an intrinsic account of movement, and a bottom level for explanations. There always remains the inexplicable. Why anything? Why this?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Important relations are duration (order of successive things) and position (order of coexisting things) and interaction. Position without a thing mediating is presence. Beyond these is connection when things move one another. Thus things seem to be one.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the best account I can find of his epistemological angle on the unity of things. They are symptoms of the inner power of unification, and he says that God sees these relations most clearly.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
12776 Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every substance is alive.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
     A reaction: The most charitable interpretation of this is that substances are what have unity, and the best model of unity that we can grasp is the unity of an organism. The less charitable view is that he literally thinks a pebble is 'alive'. Hm.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
14484 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
     Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6
     A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Some realising thing must bring it about that composite substance contains something substantial besides monads, otherwise composites will be mere phenomena. The scholastics' active and passive powers are the substantial bond I am urging.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.01.13), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9
     A reaction: [compressed] This appears to be a major retreat, in the last year of Leibniz's life, from the full monadology he had espoused. How do monads connect to matter, and thus unify it? He is returning to Aristotelian hylomorphism.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted by them, otherwise it would be an aggregate.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: The point is that there is more to some things than there mere parts. Only some unifying principle, in addition to the mere parts, bestows a unity. Mereology is a limited activity if it has nothing to say about this issue.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16224 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
     Full Idea: Two things can't be vaguely identical, because then a would have an indeterminacy which b lacks (namely, being perfectly identical to b), so by Leibniz's Law they can't be identical.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978], 4.7) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: [my summary of Katherine Hawley's summary (2001:118) of Evans] Hawley considers the argument to be valid. I have grave doubts about whether b's identity with b is the sort of property needed for an application of Liebniz's Law.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is a reason why not every possible thing exists.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: This is the kind of wonderful speculative metaphysical remark that we are not allowed to make any more. Needless to say, he doesn't tell us what the reason is. Overcrowding, perhaps.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In the mutual agreement of perceivers consists the truth of the phenomena.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: This remark is startling close to the 'perspectivism' that crops up in the late notebooks of Nietzsche. Leibniz was keen on relativism in many areas, starting with the nature of space. I personally think Leibniz meant 'knowledge' rather than 'truth'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Miracles should not be increased beyond necessity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Leibniz defends miracles (where Spinoza dismisses them). This remark is, of course, an echo of Ockham's Razor, that 'entities' should not be multiplied beyond necessity. It is hard to disagree with his proposal. Zero might be result, though.