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6248
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Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
We boast of our mighty reason above other animals, but its processes are too slow, too full of doubt, to serve us in every exigency, either for our preservation, without external senses, or to influence our actions for good without the moral sense.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.III)
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A reaction:
This idea was taken up by Hume, and it must have influence Hume's general scepticism about the importance of reason. What this idea misses is the enormous influence of prior reasoning on our quick decisions.
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6239
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We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
Let us consider if a traitor, who would sell his own country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as an hero who defends us: and yet we can love the treason, and hate the traitor.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VI)
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A reaction:
A nice example, which certainly refutes any claim that morality is entirely and directly self-interested. High-minded idealism, though, is not the only alternative explanation. We admire loyalty, but not loyalty to, say, Hitler.
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6240
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The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
The moral sense is not an innate idea or knowledge, but a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation, from actions observed, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VIII)
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A reaction:
This may claim a pure moral intuition, but it is also close to Kantian universalising of the rules for behaviour. It is also a variation on Descartes' 'natural light' of reason. Of course, if we say the ideas are 'received', where are they received from?
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6242
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We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
Neither benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition; if they could, then we could be bribed into any affection whatsoever toward any object.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.IV)
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A reaction:
Of course, notoriously, the vast mass of people have often been bribed to love a politician, by low taxes, or bread and circuses. Still, you cannot choose to love or admire someone, you just do. Not much free will there.
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6244
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Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
Human nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested hatred, or an ultimate desire of the misery of others, when we imagine them not pernicious to us, or opposite to our interests; ..that is only the effect of self-love, not disinterested malice.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.VII)
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A reaction:
I suppose it is true that even the worst criminals brooding in prison don't wish the entire population of some foreign country to die in pain. Only a very freakish person would wish the human race were extinct. A very nice observation.
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6243
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As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
How comes it that we do not lose, at the approach of death, all concern for our families, friends, or country?
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.V)
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A reaction:
A nice question. No doubt some people do cease to care, but on the whole it raises the 'last round' problem in social contract theory, which is why fulfil your part of a bargain if it is too late to receive the repayment afterwards?
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7903
|
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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6241
|
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
Mere courage, or contempt of danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the defence of the innocent, or repairing of wrongs or self-interest, would only entitle its possessor to bedlam.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.I)
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A reaction:
If many criminals would love to rob a bank, but only a few have the nerve to attempt it, we can hardly deny that the latter exhibit a sort of courage. The Greeks say that good sense must be involved, but few of them were so moral about courage.
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6245
|
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery.
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From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.VIII)
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A reaction:
The first use of a phrase taken up by Bentham. This is not just an anticipation of utilitarianism, it is utilitarianism, with all its commitment to consequentialism (but see Idea 6246), and to the maximising of happiness. It is a brilliant idea.
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20584
|
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Critics of desire satisfaction theory argue that it gets things backward. We desire things because we already think they are good in some way. Desire theory puts it the other way round.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Is happiness')
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A reaction:
Not persuasive. It looks to me as if skiing is a spendid pastime, but I have no desire to do it. More exercise would even be a good for me, but I don't desire that either. Indeed, right now I desire more cake, which is very naughty.
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20598
|
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
In any democratic state, who are 'the people' who get to rule themselves? That is, who gets to participate in the public decision process, and who is excluded?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
In the modern world this may be clear-cut when a democracy gets started, but people move around so much more that every democracy is faced with new types of residents. Then there is age, criminality, mental health...
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20596
|
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Imagine a new original position where we adopted rules for global justice without knowing which country we would inhabit.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Cosmopolitan')
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A reaction:
Nice question. North Korea!! Rawls says it is only within a nation, because there is a co-operative enterprise going on. That is, I presume, that the choosers involved are a 'people'. See Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' for an alternative.
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20593
|
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
The veil of ignorance ensures that the original position is fair, but it also guarantees that agreement will be unanimous (which would be impossible if each person insisted that justice should match her own conception).
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Original')
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A reaction:
Not clear about this. If I choose very cautiously, but others choose very riskily, and they win, why I should I fall in with their unanimity? That can only be if we agree to be unanimous in backing the result. Like a democratic election?
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20608
|
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Legitimacy and perceived legitimacy do not always go together: people can believe that their institutions are just, but they may be wrong. Is the reverse also possible? Can institutions be legitimate if people believe they are not?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What are')
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A reaction:
Nice thoughts. An institution cannot be just merely because it is seen that way (if someone gets away with rigging an election). If they are just but seen as unjust, I presume they are legitimate (which is objective), but disfunctional.
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20597
|
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
If we let people's influence on election outcomes depend on their wealth, then we don't have a democracy any more. We have a plutocracy, where the people who have all the wealth have all the political power too.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Intro')
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A reaction:
[see Michael Walzer on 'complex equality'] This is startling true in the United States, but still somewhat true elsewhere. Being wealthy enough to control the media is the key in modern democracies.
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20600
|
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Are there areas which are excluded from democratic decision making? Or should all issues of public concern be decided through a democratic process?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
Crucially, are we discussing direct democracy, or representative democracy? In Britain all major decisions are made by the cabinet. Our representatives appoint leaders, who then appoint the decision makers. Judiciary is non-democratic.
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20609
|
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
It is possible that the people who supported several losing candidates might have joined forces and had a majority. For that reason, many countries have a runoff election.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Does democracy')
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A reaction:
The problem is that there is no rationale as to who stands in an election. If their views are evenly spread, the first result seems OK. If there are five left-wingers and one right-winger, a runoff seems to be produce a more just result.
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20599
|
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
A major question for democracy is how are the contributions of different people aggregated into a collective decision? Must votes have equal weight and consideration, or is it permissible for different people's votes to count differently?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
Mill hoped that wise and knowledgeable people would have a strong influence over the others, but we have recently moved into the post-truth era, where we are swamped by bogus facts. Does that strengthen the case for elite voting?
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20613
|
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Many of our most important obligations are things we did not consent to. If you think you have obligations to your family, did you choose to have them as family members?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Gratitude')
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A reaction:
A question that gets close to the heart of the communitarian ideal, I think. We choose to have children, and we bring them up, but even then we don't choose who our children are.
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20604
|
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Choice theorists hold that rights protect our rights to make autonomous judgements, because our basic right to autonomy must be protected, The theory has a problem with people unable to exercise autonomy (such as infants and animals).
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Interest')
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A reaction:
The problem of infants and animals looks like a decisive objection to me. We obviously don't protect dangerous or hostile autonomous judgements, and it is not clear why protecting stupid autonomy should be basic.
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6251
|
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
Perfect rights are necessary to the public good, and it makes those miserable whose rights are thus violated; …imperfect rights tend to the improvement and increase of good in a society, but are not necessary to prevent universal misery.
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|
From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.VI)
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|
A reaction:
This is a very utilitarian streak in Hutcheson, converting natural law into its tangible outcome in actual happiness or misery. The distinction here is interesting (taken up by Mill), but there is a very blurred borderline.
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20615
|
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Classical just war theory: resist aggression; just cause must be the real reason; must be proportionate; last resort; not futile; made by a nation's authority.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'Ius ad')
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|
A reaction:
[My squashed summary of Tuckness and Wolf] A very helpful list, from Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas. So where is the sticking point for pacifists? Presumably it is never the last resort, and aggression should not answer aggression.
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20616
|
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Classical just war theory during a war: force must be proportional; only legitimate targets; avoid prohibited weapons; safety for prisoners of war; no reprisals.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'In the conduct')
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|
A reaction:
What of massacre if a besieged city refuses to surrender? It was commonplace, and sometimes the only way to achieve victory. What if the enemy breaks all the rules? Nice rules though. At the heart of civilisation.
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6249
|
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]
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Full Idea:
To call the laws of the supreme Deity good or holy or just, if these be constituted by laws, or the will of a superior, must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than 'God wills what he wills' or 'His will is conformable to his will'.
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|
From:
Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V)
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|
A reaction:
This argues not only against God as the source of morality, but also against any rules, such as those of the Categorical Imperative. Why should I follow the Categorical Imperative? What has value must dictate the rules. Is obedience the highest value?
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