4 ideas
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Every proposition, no matter what subject matter it may have, is entirely about being. | |
From: David Lewis (Things qua Truthmakers [2003], p.26), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 4.VI | |
A reaction: Since Lewis's propositions are sets of possible worlds, I presume this claim is made because proposition relates to all of the possible worlds, which therefore presumably embody Being. |
21862 | Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty] |
Full Idea: Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think' but of 'I can'. | |
From: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception [1945], p.159), quoted by Beth Lord - Spinoza's Ethics 2 'Sensation' | |
A reaction: The point here (quoted during a discussion of Spinoza) is that you can't leave out the role of the body, which seems correct. |
20750 | The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty] |
Full Idea: I do not have one perception, then another, and between them a link brought about by the mind. Rather, each perspective merges into the other [against a unified background]. | |
From: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception [1945], p.329-30), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual' | |
A reaction: I take this to be another piece of evidence pointing to realism as the best explanation of experience. A problem for Descartes is what unites the sequence of thoughts. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |