Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Things qua Truthmakers' and 'Warrant and Proper Function'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Every proposition, no matter what subject matter it may have, is entirely about being.
     From: David Lewis (Things qua Truthmakers [2003], p.26), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 4.VI
     A reaction: Since Lewis's propositions are sets of possible worlds, I presume this claim is made because proposition relates to all of the possible worlds, which therefore presumably embody Being.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: A modified version of reliabilism proposes that a belief is justified in case it is the product of a process that is working according to its 'proper function' in the environment for which it is appropriate.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function [1993]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §1.5.4
     A reaction: Something might infallibly indicate something without that being its proper function (e.g. 'Red sky at night/ Shepherds' delight'). An inaccurate clock is fulfilling its proper function (telling the time), but not very well.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').