7 ideas
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
Full Idea: Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2 | |
A reaction: This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values. |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Chance is the name for some law that is unknown to us? If you say 'each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws', it seems to me it is not these laws which made the tie turn up sixes, for the laws act the same when other throws come up. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.333) |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8 |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.334) | |
A reaction: The point, presumably, is that one phase of an organisms moves into another, and the 'individuals' are not distinct enough for their 'death' to be a significant transition. A nicely mind-expanding thought. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to baldly attribute it to chance. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.337) | |
A reaction: If now complete is even remotely available, then that doesn't seem to matter too much, but if there is one message modern physics teaches philosophy, it is that we should not give up on trying to answer the deeper questions. |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.331) | |
A reaction: This nicely encapsulates modern doubts about whether the so-called 'laws' of nature actually capture what is going on in the real world. |