Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'Counterfactuals'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
2764 Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
     A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19080 Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
     Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
     A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14361 Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
     Full Idea: Unlike Stalnaker, Lewis holds that indicative conditionals have the truth conditions of material conditionals.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Frank Jackson - Conditionals 'Further'
     A reaction: Thus Lewis only uses the possible worlds account for subjunctive conditionals, where Stalnaker uses it for both. Lewis is defending the truth-functional account for the indicative conditionals.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
     Full Idea: According to Lewis, a counterfactual holds when the consequent is true in possible worlds very like our own except for the fact that the antecedent is true.
     From: report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.213
     A reaction: Presumably the world being very like our own would make it unlikely that there would be anything else to cause the consequent, apart from the counterfactual antecedent.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9419 A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.
     From: David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973], 3.3)