17 ideas
| 18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: In this book I will treat metaphysics as a quest for truthmakers. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: I find this appealing, though obviously you have to say what sort of truthmakers generate 'metaphysical' truths, as opposed to physics or biology. I take it that would involve truthmakers that had a high level of generality, idealisation and abstraction. |
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: Chalmers' two-dimensional conceivability account of possibility offers a defence of a priori conceptual analysis, and foundations on which a priori philosophy can be furthered. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I think I prefer Williamson's more scientific account of possibility through counterfactual conceivability, rather than Chalmers' optimistic a priori account. Deep topic, though, and the jury is still out. |
| 18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: One strategy is whenever we are presented with a sentence that might appear to entail the existence of numbers, all that we have to do is paraphrase it using a quantified logic, plus identity. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 03.5) | |
| A reaction: This nominalist strategy seems fine for manageable numbers, but gets in trouble with numbers too big to count (e.g. grains of sand in the world) , or genuine infinities. |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: We might say that those truths that do not need truth-makers are those that are negative. Those that do need truth-makers are those that are positive. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 10.8) | |
| A reaction: If you deny the existence of something, there is always an implicit domain for the denial, such as 'on the table', or 'in this building', or 'in the cosmos'. So why can't that domain be the truthmaker for a negative existential? |
| 18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: A 'minimal' truth-maker is the 'smallest' portion of reality required to make a given proposition true. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice suggestion. This seems to make Ockham's Razor an integral part of the theory of truth-makers. I would apply the same principle to explanations. An Ockhamist explanation is what explains the puzzling thing - and nothing else. |
| 18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: What power will make true 'there could be a power that does not in fact exist'? | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 04.13) | |
| A reaction: Nice question. We can't know whether it is true that a new power could exist, so we can't expect an actual truthmaker for it. Though we might predict new powers (such as for a new transuranic element), on the basis of the known ones. |
| 18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: It is not the case that Plato's wisdom = Socrates's wisdom. Platonic-wisdom and Socratic-wisdom are not the same property. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 05.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems reasonable in the case of wisdom, but not so clear in the case of indistinguishable properties of redness or squareness or mass. Nevertheless it gives nice support for trope theory. |
| 18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: It appears that substance has essential properties: it is of the essence of substance that it individuates, and it is of the essence of substance that it bears properties. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: The point being that substances are not 'bear', because they have a role to perform, and a complete blank can't fulfil a role. We can't take substance, though, seriously in ontology. It is just a label for distinct individuals. |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: When P is an essence of O it follows that P is a necessary property of O. However, P can be a necessary property of O without being an essence of O. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Knowledge') | |
| A reaction: This summarises the Kit Fine view with which I sympathise. However, I dislike presenting essence as a mere list of properties, which is only done for the convenience of logicians. But was Jessie Owens a great athlete after he lost his speed? |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: Conceivability as evidence for possibility needs four interpretations. How is 'conceivable' defined or explained? How strongly is the idea endorsed? How does inconceivability fit in? And what kind of possibility (logical, physical etc) is implied? | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
| A reaction: [some compression] Williamson's counterfactual account helps with the first one. The strength largely depends on whether your conceptions are well informed. Inconceivability may be your own failure. All types of possibility can be implied. |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: If we aim to derive impossibility from inconceivability, we may either face a failure to conceive something, or arrive at a state of incoherence in conceiving. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
| A reaction: [summary] Thus I can't manage to conceive a multi-dimensional hypercube, but I don't even try to conceive a circular square. In both cases, we must consider whether the inconceivability results from our own inadequacy, rather than from the facts. |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: Is it possible for an individual to possess objectual understanding without knowing they possess the objectual understanding? | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
| A reaction: Hm. A nice new question to loose sleep over. We can't demand a regress of meta-understandings, so at some point you just understand. Birds understand nests. Equivalent: can you understand P, but can't explain P? Skilled, but inarticulate. |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: In the Gettier case of deductive justification, what we have is a separation between the source of the justification and the truthmaker for the belief. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Distinction') | |
| A reaction: A very illuminating insight into the Gettier problem. As a fan of truthmakers, I'm wondering if this might quickly solve it. |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: The disjunctive belief that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', which Smith believes, derives its justification from the left disjunct, and its truth from the right disjunct. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Application') | |
| A reaction: The example is from Gettier's original article. Have we finally got a decent account of the original Gettier problem, after fifty years of debate? Philosophical moves with delightful slowness. |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| Full Idea: A representation cannot accidentally be about an object. Aboutness is in general an intentional relation. | |
| From: Anand Vaidya (Understanding and Essence [2010], 'Objections') | |
| A reaction: 'Intentional' with a 't', not with an 's'. This strikes me as important. Critics dislike the idea of 'representation' because if you passively place a representation and its subject together, what makes the image do the representing job? Answer: I do! |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: One might be tempted to the view that there are as many different propositions as there are thoughts that could be thought and sentences that could be uttered. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 04.5.3) | |
| A reaction: A fairly orthodox view I take to be crazy. I think it is a view designed for logic, rather than for how the world is. Why tie propositions to what can be thought, and then introduce unthought propositions? Why no unthinkable propositions? |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |