32 ideas
| 501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
| 514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: If someone wishes to say that ethical statements are statements of fact, only it is a queer sort of fact, he is welcome to do so. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.233) | |
| A reaction: The word 'queer' was picked up by Mackie and developed into his error theory, that moral facts are a misunderstanding. Personally I think that moral facts might be teleological facts, but that is rather hard to demonstrate. |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Asking whether the attitude that one has adopted is the right attitude comes down to asking whether one is prepared to stand by it. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.244) | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that someone who persisted in being ruthlessly selfish might nevertheless distinguish their behaviour from the grudging concession that the 'right' thing to do might be quite different. |
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: All moral theories, intuitionist, naturalistic, objectivist, emotive, and the rest, in so far as they are philosophical theories, are neutral as regards actual conduct; they belong to the field of meta-ethics, not ethics proper. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949]) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, Ayer doesn't seem willing to accept 'ethics proper' as being 'philosophical'. Given the modern rise of applied ethics, it seems suprising to say that even normative ethics is not philosophical. Utilitarianism seems not to be philosophical. |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: A moral philosopher will have his moral standards and will sometimes make moral judgements, but these moral judgements cannot be a logical consequence of his philosophy. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.247) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an assertion of the is-ought distinction. Personally this strikes me as totally false. Ayer needs to think more deeply about moral philosophy! |
| 525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
| A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: I suspect that the experiences which some philosophers want to describe as intuitions, or a quasi-sensory apprehensions, of good are not significantly different from those that I want to describe as feelings of approval. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.239) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard ground for rejecting intuitionism, along with the point that even if intuitions are not just feelings of approval, it seems impossible to tell the difference. |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: In saying that Brutus or Raskolnikov acted rightly, I am giving myself and others leave to imitate them should similar circumstances arise. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.237) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a reply to the Frege-Geach Problem, of why we have emotional attitudes to crimes that mean nothing to us. Such crimes, however, involve our virtues, and don't depend on awaiting 'similar circumstances'. |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: To say, as I once did, that moral judgements are merely expressive of certain feelings is an oversimplification; ..moral attitudes consist in certain patterns of behaviour, and the expression of a judgement is an element in the pattern. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.238) | |
| A reaction: This seems to switch from emotivism to what Frank Jackson calls 'moral functionalism', where morality is what gets us from certain emotional responses to willed actions. This strikes me, like most functional explanations, as wrong. |
| 502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
| A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
| 507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
| A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
| 521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
| A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
| 505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
| A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
| 508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
| A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
| 520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
| A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
| 522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
| A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
| 506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
| A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
| 523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
| 503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
| 518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
| A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
| 499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
| 524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
| 519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
| 1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
| 526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
| 511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
| 498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
| A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
| 1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |