9 ideas
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| Full Idea: That the first motion, or the first effect, whatever it be, cannot be produced necessarily, and, consequently, that the First Cause must be a free agent, has been demonstrated clearly and unanswerably. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 8) | |
| A reaction: He has said that the First Cause can only be conceived by us as an 'agent'. If there is an agential First Cause, then he must be right. It is this need for God to be free which makes scepticism about free will unacceptable to many. |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| Full Idea: There can be no will without such a degree of understanding, at least, as gives the conception of that which we will. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this 'conception' includes an understanding of the probable consequences, but they are of infinite complexity. I see this as an objection to 'ultimate' free will and responsibility, because there are only ever degrees of understanding. |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| Full Idea: I believe in moral liberty first because we have a natural conviction of belief that in many cases we act freely, second because we are accountable, and third because we can prosecute an end by a long series of means adapted. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: This is his final summary of why he believes in free will. Why didn't Plato and Aristotle have this natural belief? He could only believe we are 'accountable' because he believes in free will. Ants and bees pursue lengthy projects. Hm. |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| Full Idea: A motive is equally incapable of action and of passion; because it is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived. …Motives may be compared to advice or exhortation. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 4) | |
| A reaction: We say people are motivated by greed or anger or love, which seems a bit stronger than mere advice. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 23812 | Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil] |
| Full Idea: To define 'force' - it is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing. Exercised to the limit, it turns man into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Iliad or the Poem of Force [1940], p.183) | |
| A reaction: She celebrates The Iliad as the great examination of force in human affairs. I have felt that sense of reduction to a thing whenever anyone above me in the hierarchy has arbitrarily exerted their power over me. |
| 23813 | Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Only he who has measured the dominion of force, and knows how not to respect it, is capable of love and justice. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Iliad or the Poem of Force [1940], p.212) | |
| A reaction: There are, of course, occasions when we are grateful to people who exercise appropriate force on our behalf. I think she was concerned with what is inappropriate. |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Every man who understands the language knows that neither priority, nor constant conjunction, nor both taken together, imply efficiency. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 2) | |
| A reaction: This invites the question of how we do know causal events, if none of our experiences are enough to prove it. Reid says we have an innate knowledge that all events are caused, but that isn't much help. The presence of power? |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The law of nature respecting matter is grounded upon this principle: That matter is an inert, inactive substance, which does not act, but is acted upon. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents [1788], 5) | |
| A reaction: A clear statement (alongside Euler's) of the 18th century view, still with us, but strikes me as entirely wrong. Their view needs the active power of God to drive the laws. Matter has intrinsic primitive powers, and laws describe patterns of behaviour. |