Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' and 'Essential vs Accidental Properties'

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11 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
     Full Idea: It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008])
     A reaction: Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
     Full Idea: An 'individual essence' is a property that in addition to being essential is also unique to the object, in the sense that it is not possible that something distinct from that object possesses that property.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §5)
     A reaction: She cites a 'haecceity' (or mere bare identity) as a trivial example of an individual essence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
     Full Idea: According to 'sortal essentialism', an object could not have been of a radically different kind than it in fact is.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §4)
     A reaction: This strikes me as thoroughly wrong. Things belong in kinds because of their properties. Could you remove all the contingent features of a tiger, leaving it as merely 'a tiger', despite being totally unrecognisable?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
     Full Idea: It is easy to confuse the notion of an essential property that a thing could not lack, with a property it could not lose. My having spent Christmas 2007 in Tennessee is a non-essential property I could not lose.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: The idea that having spent Christmas in Tennessee is a property I find quite bewildering. Is my not having spent my Christmas in Tennessee one of my properties? I suspect that real unlosable properties are essential ones.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
     Full Idea: The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: [She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
     Full Idea: There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R]
     Full Idea: Laws they are not which public approbation hath not made so.
     From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], I s.10), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government 134 n1
     A reaction: Margaret Thatcher's Poll Tax, rejected by public rebellion, illustrates the point.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
     Full Idea: Men saw that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. This contrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them.
     From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], I s.10), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government 111 n1
     A reaction: One British school has a single rule, that pupils 'shall always treat other people with respect'. Presumably the rulers, as well as the pupils, must decide when this is transgressed. The rule of law may be preferable.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R]
     Full Idea: Laws human must be made according to the general laws of Nature.
     From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], III s.9), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government
     A reaction: The point simply seems to be that they won't get assent from the public if they are not in accord with natural justice. Positivists say you can make any damned law you like.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]
     Full Idea: Things natural …do so necessarily observe their certain laws, that as long as they keep those forms which give them their being they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise than they do.
     From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], 1.3.4), quoted by Marc Lange - Laws and Lawmakers 1.2
     A reaction: Cited by some as the beginnings of the idea of 'laws of nature', but it is striking that Hooker says the laws are controlled by 'forms' (which are Aristotelian essences). This is an essentialist view of laws, not a regularity or divine power one.