41 ideas
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15) | |
| A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs. |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7) | |
| A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well. |
| 15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Someone first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts and asks your agreement that all the parts are identical with that unity, then ridicules you that you have to admit one is many, and indefinitely many, and again that the many are only only one thing. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) | |
| A reaction: This is a passing aporia, but actually seems to approach the central mystery of the metaphysics of identity. A thing can't be a 'unity' if there are not things to unify? So what sorts of 'unification' are there? |
| 9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It will be ridiculous if our student knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself, but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, used in housebuilding. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 62a) | |
| A reaction: This is the equivalent of being able to recite numbers, but not to count objects. It also resembles Molyneux's question (to Locke), of whether recognition by one sense entails recognition by others. Nice (and a bit anti-platonist!). |
| 9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The arithmetic of the many computes sums of unequal units, such as two armies, or two herds, ..but philosopher's arithmetic computes when it is guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 56d) | |
| A reaction: But of course 'the many' are ironing out the differences too, when they say there are 'three armies'. Shocking snob, Plato. Even philosophers are interested in the difference between three armies and three platoons. |
| 15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Any blend [mixture] which does not have measure or the nature of proportion in any way whatsoever, of necessity destroys both its ingredients and, primarily, itself. It is truly no blend at all, but a kind of unblended disaster. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) | |
| A reaction: Obviously there can be chaotic mixtures, but I guess Plato is picking out mixtures about which we can say something |
| 14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Any kind of mixture that does not ...possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases but really an unconnected medley, and ruin what contains it. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64d) | |
| A reaction: My guess is that Plato is thinking of the decay of living things when they die, losing the proportions of psuché, and then applying this to the unity of inanimate objects as well. One might compare Leibniz's monads. |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method' | |
| A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for. |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19) | |
| A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists. |
| 4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If man is one, and the good is one, how are they supposed to exist? Do they stay the same even though they are found in many things at the same time, and are they then entirely separated from themselves, which seems most impossible of all? | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15a) | |
| A reaction: Presumably Plato anguishes over this because he thinks Forms are self-predicating (the Good is good). Big mistake. The Good fathers good particulars which resemble itself, but are diluted? |
| 15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 15d) | |
| A reaction: This is not scepticism about wholes on Plato's part, but a reminder of an obvious fact, that in thought we can break the world up and put it back together again. It is a touchstone of the debate, though. |
| 374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Someone can theoretically divide an object into constituent parts, concede that they are one object, and then claim that therefore the one is many and the many are one. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 14e) |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
| A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
| A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
| A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
| A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
| 389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Could we attribute certainty to studying aspects of the world, such as how it arose, or acts, or is acted upon, when none of them ever was or will be constant? Of course not. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 59b) |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454. |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
| A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind. |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18) | |
| A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them. |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
| A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical. |
| 390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Moderation and proportion seem, in effect, to be beauty and excellence. So now this property we're looking for, goodness, has taken refuge in beauty. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 64e) |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If we are unable to net the good in a single concept, three must capture it: namely, beauty, proportion and truth. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 65a) | |
| A reaction: Very interesting. More illuminating than the discussion of the Good in 'Republic'. Is a handsome and honest murderer good? Is beauty part of the nature of the good, or a hallmark of it? |
| 392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Both intellect and pleasure are completely absolved of being the good itself, since they both lack independence, that is, sufficiency and perfection. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Plato disagreeing with Socrates, who sees reason and intellect as central to morality. Presumable he means that the good should be a primitive. Why is pleasure not sufficient? |
| 393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Good is supreme, followed by beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pure pleasure, then mixed pleasure. | |
| From: report of Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: He tells us that pure pleasures are simple pleasures. Epicurus presumably read this. No mention of truth, unless that is part of reason. Why does he value beauty so highly? |
| 385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Living beings experience pleasures and pains which seem, and indeed are, false. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 42c) | |
| A reaction: The idea that there are 'authentic' pleasures and pains needs some investigation. Misguided anger is a false pain? Vanity is a false pleasure? |
| 387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A tiny little pleasure is, if uncontaminated by pain, always more pleasant, truer and finer than a large amount. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 53b) | |
| A reaction: More Platonic puritanism. Is a complete absence of pleasure the highest pleasure of all? I don't think I understand 'truer'. Why would a pleasure be false because it is intense? |
| 373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The pleasantness of pleasure is not in dispute, but where we say the majority of pleasures are bad, though some are good, you are attributing goodness to all of them. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 13b) | |
| A reaction: Bentham's plausible view is that the feeling of pleasure is always good, and the badness is in some other aspect of the event. Compare sadistic fantasy with sadistic action. |
| 379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Neither pleasure nor intellect comprises the good. If it did it would have to be sufficient and perfect. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 22b) | |
| A reaction: Seems sensible. I can't make sense of any vision of the good which consists of suppressing some aspect of human nature. (Hm. Our capacity for violence?) |
| 371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: My contention is that reason, intellect, memory - along with correct belief and true calculation - are far better than pleasure for all creatures capable of attaining them. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 11b) | |
| A reaction: Why? Is it better to understand deeply, or to act well? Can we just say there is objective good and subjective good, and they have little in common? Depressed heroes. |
| 376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Try thinking about the life of pleasure without reason, and the life of reason without pleasure. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 20e) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that we see the two as more deeply entangled that Plato did. It would be hard to motivate reasoning if we didn't enjoy it. Pleasure without reason sound dire. |
| 382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is unlikely that the gods feel pleasure or the opposite. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 33b) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 383. |
| 381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When harmony is being restored, and the natural state of harmony is approached, then pleasure arises. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 31d) | |
| A reaction: The supreme value of harmony was important to Plato, but most of us are less convinced, I suspect. The way to achieve harmony is to avoid anything stressful. |
| 386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Intensity of pleasure and pain is to be found not in a good state of body and soul, but in a worthless one. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 45e) | |
| A reaction: This just seems to be Plato's puritanism. How can you criticise someone for experience genuine intense pain? Experiencing intense pleasure is no crime, but pursuit of it might be. |
| 388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A hedonist must say that someone who happens to be feeling pain rather than pleasure is, as long as the pain lasts, a bad man, even if he is the most virtuous man in the world. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 55b) |
| 377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Would you, Protarchus, gladly live your whole life experiencing only the greatest pleasure? Would you think you were still lacking anything? | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21a) | |
| A reaction: the pleasure machine problem |
| 378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is not the life of a human being, but the life of a jellyfish. | |
| From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 21c) |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
| A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
| A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin. |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12) | |
| A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads. |