24029
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Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
Among the simple things, we must also place their negation and deprivation, insofar as they fall under out intelligence, because the idea of nothingness, of the instant, of rest, is no less true an idea than that of existence, of duration, of motion.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12)
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A reaction:
He sees the 'simple' things as the foundation of all knowledge, because they are self-evident. Not sure about 'no less true', since the specific nothings are parasitic on the somethings.
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16730
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If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
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A reaction:
If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.
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24020
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We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
By intuition I mean the conception of an attentive mind, so distinct and clear that it has no doubt about what it understands, …a conception that is borne of the sole light of reason. Thus everyone can see intuitively that he exists.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 03)
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A reaction:
By 'intuition' he means self-evident certainty, whereas my concept is of a judgement of which I am reasonably confident, but without sufficient grounds for certainty. This is an early assertion of the Cogito, with a clear statement of its grounding.
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24031
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When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
If Socrates says he doubts everything, it necessarily follows that he at least understands that he doubts, and that he knows that something can be true or false: for these are notions that necessarily accompany doubt.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12)
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A reaction:
An early commitment to the Cogito. But note that the inescapable commitment is not just to his existence, but also to his own reasoning, and his own commitment, and to the possibility of truth. Many, many things are undeniable.
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24025
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Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
We require two conditions for intuition, namely that the proposition appear clear and distinct, and then that it be understood all at once and not successively. Deduction, on the other hand, implies a certain movement of the mind.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 11)
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A reaction:
A nice distinction. Presumably with deduction you grasp each step clearly, and then the inference and conclusion, and you can then forget the previous steps because you have something secure.
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24034
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If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
Let there be a man who has sometimes seen the fundamental colours, and never the intermediate and mixed colours; it may be that by a sort of deduction he will represent those he has not seen, by their resemblance to the others.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14)
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A reaction:
Thus Descartes solved Hume's shade of blue problem, by means of 'a sort of deduction' from resemblance, where Hume was paralysed by his need to actually experience it. Dogmatic empiricism is a false doctrine!
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24021
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The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
If the method shows clearly how we must use intuition to avoid mistaking the false for the true, and how deduction must operate to lead us to the knowledge of all things, it will be complete in my opinion.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04)
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A reaction:
A perfect statement of his foundationalist view. It needs a clear and distinct basis, and the steps of building must be strictly logical. Of course, most of our knowledge relies on induction, rather than deduction.
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16619
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We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
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A reaction:
He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.
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24026
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Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
There are four faculties in us which we can use to know: intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory.
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From:
René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12)
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A reaction:
Philosophers have to attribute faculties to the mind, even if the psychologists and neuroscientists won't accept them. We must infer the sources of our modes of understanding. He is cautious about imagination.
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16593
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Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
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A reaction:
If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.
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16729
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How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
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A reaction:
This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.
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