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19428
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Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
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A reaction:
I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do.
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16730
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If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
Since these atoms are the whole of the corporeal matter or substance that exists in bodies, if we conceive or notice anything else to exist in these bodies, that is not a substance but only some kind of mode of the substance.
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
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A reaction:
If the atoms have a few qualities of their own, are they just modes? If they are genuine powers, then there can be emergent powers, which are rather more than mere 'modes'.
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5047
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The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139)
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A reaction:
How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'.
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16619
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We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
Nothing beyond qualities is perceived by the senses. …When we refer to the substance in which the qualities inhere, we do this through induction, by which we reason that some subject lies under the quality.
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.6.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
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A reaction:
He talks of 'induction' (in an older usage), but he seems to mean abduction, since he never makes any observations of the substances being proposed.
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19429
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The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
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A reaction:
This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral.
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16593
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Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
The vulgar think atoms lack parts and are free of all magnitude, and hence nothing other than a mathematical point, but it is something solid and hard and compact, as to leave no room for division, separation and cutting. No force in nature can divide it.
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.3.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.2
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A reaction:
If you gloatingly think the atom has now been split, ask whether electrons and quarks now fit his description. Pasnau notes that though atoms are indivisible, they are not incorruptible, and could go out of existence, or be squashed.
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16729
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How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]
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Full Idea:
If the only material principles of things are atoms, having only size, shape, and weight, or motion, then why are so many additional qualities created and existing within the things: color, heat, flavor, odor, and innumerable others?
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From:
Pierre Gassendi (Syntagma [1658], II.1.5.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.4
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A reaction:
This is pretty much the 'hard question' about the mind-body relation. Bacon said that heat was just motion of matter. I would say that this problem is gradually being solved in my lifetime.
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