10 ideas
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15) | |
| A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot. |
| 23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism. | |
| From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
| A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules. |
| 23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161) | |
| A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires. |
| 536 | We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon] |
| Full Idea: A man can best conduct himself in harmony with justice, if when in company of witnesses he upholds the laws, and when alone without witnesses he upholds the edicts of nature. | |
| From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B44), quoted by Anon (Oxy) - Oxyrhynchus Papyrus XI.1364 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure how you identify the 'edicts of nature', without guidance from other people or the law. Natural behaviour can be pretty grim. |
| 1557 | To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon] |
| Full Idea: The way to get maximum advantage to yourself from justice is to treat the laws as important when other people are present, but when there is nobody else with you to value the demands of nature. | |
| From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B44A), quoted by Anon (Oxy) - Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 1364A | |
| A reaction: This looks like a pretty good description of the majority of people active in politics. |
| 540 | The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon] |
| Full Idea: One's character must necessarily grow like that with which one spends the greater part of the day. | |
| From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B62), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.41 |
| 22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
| Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18) | |
| A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world. |
| 22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164) | |
| A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion. |
| 539 | Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy. | |
| From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B61), quoted by (who?) - where? |