Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?' and 'Principle of Life and Plastic Natures'

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11 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Realists feel that the one-place predication 'a is F' leaves something unexplained, yet all that is offered is a two-place predication (a relational statement). There is an equal problem about 'a having F-ness'.
     From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.97)
     A reaction: I think this is a key argument on the nominalist side - the denial that the theory of universals actually makes any progress at all in giving an explanation of what is going on around here. Platonist have the problem of 'partaking'.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Talk of 'particulars' and 'universals' clutters the landscape without adding to our understanding. We should rest with the basic fact that a is F.
     From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.98)
     A reaction: Ramsey was first to challenge the basic distinction. I find the approach of Quine and Devitt unsatisfactory. We abandon explanation when it is totally hopeless, but that is usually in the face of complexity. Properties are difficult but simple.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
     Full Idea: For 'a and b have the same property, F-ness' the Quinean Nominalist has a paraphrase to hand: 'a and b are both F'. ..In denying that this object need have properties, the Quinean is not denying that it really is F.
     From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.95)
     A reaction: The question that remains is why 'F' is used of both a and b. We don't call a and b 'a', because they are different. Quine falls back on resemblance. I suspect Quineans of hiding behind the semantics.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied by consciousness.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195)
     A reaction: This idea is very important in Leibniz, because non-conscious or barely conscious thoughts and perceptions explain a huge amount about behaviour, reality and morality.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Everything takes place in souls as if there were no body, and everything takes place in bodies as if there were no souls.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198)
     A reaction: I don't think I have ever encountered a modern thinker who accepts this view. Leibniz rejected Occasionalism, but his account depends entirely on the role of God, to set up the pre-established harmony. Why would God do that?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Death, like generation, is only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.195)
     A reaction: Leibniz has a very unusual view of death, since neither minds nor their bodies can ever be wholly destroyed. Death is a kind of shrinking. I suspect that he was wrong about that.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190)
     A reaction: This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422.
Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is no particle of matter which does not contain organic bodies.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.198)
     A reaction: Cf Idea 19416. There seems to be an interaction problem here (solved, presumably, by pre-established harmony). The organic bodies are there to explain the active behaviour of matter, but the related matter seems intrinsically inert.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The maxim that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, according to the laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.194)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's endorsement (uncredited) to Aquinas's First Way. It is hard to see how the laws of mechanics could have anything to say about the origin of movement. And doesn't the law say that the motions of God need a mover?
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof of God's existence, since it is manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause on which they all depend.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.192)
     A reaction: Adjacent harmony seems self-explanatory, but remote harmony is interesting evidence for God. Hence modern quantum non-locality should make us all wonder whether there is a deeper explanation.