Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas' and 'Letters to Fichte'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
     A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
     A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Life and rationality are pointless if we can only contemplate the freedom of our own ego [Jacobi]
     Full Idea: If the highest upon which I can reflect, what I can contemplate, is my empty and pure, naked and mere ego, with its autonomy and freedom: then rational self-contemplation, then rationality is for me a curse - I deplore my existence.
     From: Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799], Ch.2), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro
     A reaction: This is a rebellion against Fichte's interpretation of Kant. It is a lovely cry from the heart on behalf of everyone who resents lines of philosophical thinking that seem to imprison the mind and cut us off from the ordinary world and real life.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Jacobi was the first philosopher to talk of nihilism [Jacobi, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Jacobi was the first to philosophically employ the concept of nihilism.
     From: report of Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.2
     A reaction: Critchley explains that it was Jacobi's fear that Fichte was drawing nihilist conclusions from Kant's philosophy. This fear may be seen as the beginning of what is loosely called 'continental philosophy'. A worthy subject for thinkers...
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.