6 ideas
| 9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
| Full Idea: In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false. | |
| From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
| A reaction: A lovely remark! In a flash you suddenly see why philosophers expend such vast energy on such unpromising views of reality (e.g. idealism, panpsychism). This might be the best definition of philosophy I have yet discovered. |
| 20329 | A work of art is an artifact created for the artworld [Dickie] |
| Full Idea: A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public. | |
| From: George Dickie (The New Institutional Theory of Art [1983], p.53) | |
| A reaction: This is the culminating definition in his paper, deriving originally from Danto, and an improvement of his earlier more complex definition. Since this definition amounts to 'this is art if I say it is art', it doesn't seem to reveal much. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
| Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt. | |
| From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
| A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty. |
| 9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
| Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty. | |
| From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only. |
| 9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
| Full Idea: The appreciation of the goodness of the effect is different from desire for the effect, and will originate not the desire but the sense of obligation to produce it. | |
| From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful rebuttal of Hume, and a much better account of duty than Kant's idea that it arises from reason. Perception of value is what generates duty. And (with Frankfurt) we may say that love is what generates value. |