Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects' and 'Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags)'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta]
     Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea.
     From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2)
     A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta]
     Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F.
     From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2)
     A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
     Full Idea: Aenesidemus does not allow either happiness or pleasure or prudence or any other goal held by anyone on the basis of philosophical doctrine as the goal of life; rather, he says that there just is no such thing as a goal which is recognised by all people.
     From: report of Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags) [c.60 BCE], Bk 8) by 'Photius Bibliotheca' - Aenesidimus (frags) 170b
     A reaction: This is probably the dominant modern (post-Darwinian, existentialist) view. Personally I am sympathetic to the Aristotelian view that (to some extent) appropriate goals for life can be inferred from a fairly stable human nature.