18702
|
Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
|
|
Full Idea:
The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express.
|
|
From:
Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323)
|
|
A reaction:
In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too).
|
23279
|
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
|
|
From:
Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.
|
23278
|
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
|
|
From:
Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
|
|
A reaction:
Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?
|