5692
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Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
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Full Idea:
Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
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From:
David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
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A reaction:
This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.
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12696
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Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continuously created and that bodies are nothing at any time between the instants in motion.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669.04), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
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A reaction:
Leibniz is a little over-confident about what he has 'demonstrated', but I think (from this remark) that he would not have been displeased with quantum theory, and the notion of a 'quantum leap' and a 'Planck time'. A 'conatus' is a 'smallest motion'.
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