12191
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Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
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Full Idea:
Goodman's central idea was: 'If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted' is true if there are suitable truths from which, with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred by means of a logical, or more typically natural, law.
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From:
report of Nelson Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals [1947]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §4
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A reaction:
Goodman then discusses the problem of identifying the natural laws, and identifying the suitable truths. I'm inclined to think counterfactuals are vaguer than that; they are plausible if coherent reasons can be offered for the inference.
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12434
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Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
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Full Idea:
We must distinguish between explaining particular necessities and explaining necessity in general; and we ought to distinguish between explaining, in regard to any necessary truth, why it is true, and explaining why it is necessary.
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From:
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.308)
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A reaction:
Useful. The pluralist view I associate with Fine says we can explain types of necessity, but not necessity in general. If we seek truthmakers, there is a special case of what adds the necessity to the truth.
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12433
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If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
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Full Idea:
If the alleged necessity, e,g, 2+2=4, really does depend upon a convention governing the use of the words in which we state it, and the existence of that convention is merely a contingent matter, then it can't after all be necessary.
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From:
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.302)
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A reaction:
[Hale is citing Blackburn for this claim] Hale suggests replies, by keeping truth and meaning separate, and involving laws of logic. Blackburn clearly has a good point.
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12436
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Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
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Full Idea:
It seems to me that identity-relations among concepts have more to do with explaining how we know that vixens are female foxes etc., than with explaining why it is necessary, and, more generally, with explaining why some necessities are knowable a priori.
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From:
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], P.313)
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A reaction:
Hale rejects the conceptual and conventional accounts of necessity, in favour of the essentialist view. This strikes me as a good suggestion of Hale's, since I agree with him about the essentialism.
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