Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Persons, Character and Morality' and 'Propositional Objects'

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8 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism

18969	How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine]
	Full Idea: Suppose I say that I have given up precisely three beliefs since lunch. An over-coarse individuation could reduce the number to two, and an over-fine one could raise it to four.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.144)
	A reaction: Obviously if you ask how many beliefs I hold, it would be crazy to give a precise answer. But if I search for my cat, I give up my belief that it is in the kitchen, in the lounge and in the bathroom. That's precise enough to be three beliefs, I think.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

18967	A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
	Full Idea: A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
	A reaction: Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

18968	The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
	Full Idea: The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
	A reaction: If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character

23279	It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
	A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.

23280	Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
	A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism

23278	For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
	From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
	A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space

18970	The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine]
	Full Idea: Unless we are prepared to believe that absolute position makes sense, the very idea of a point as an entity in its own right must be rejected as not merely mysterious but absurd.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.149)
	A reaction: The fact that without absolute position we can only think of 'points' as relative to a conceptual grid doesn't stop the grid from picking out actual locations in space, as shown by latitude and longitude.