Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Basis of Morality' and 'Human Nature'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.IX.13)
     A reaction: Laughter tends to involve something unusual. We don't just burst out with a glory of vanity whenever we meet some inferiority in another person.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The will is not voluntary: for a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word 'will', which is absurd and insignificant.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.XII.5)
     A reaction: A nice simple point, allied to Nietzsche's notion that thoughts are uncontrollable (Idea 2291). Even Aquinas, who is quite a fan of free will, spotted the problem (Idea 1854). Personally I agree with Hobbes. Free will is a shibboleth.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Conceptions and apparitions are nothing really, but motion in some internal substance of the head.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.1)
     A reaction: Note that he carefully covers both thought in concepts and thought in images, and also that he is not saying that thought is the substance, but that it is a 'motion'. This strikes me as an excellent word, and I think Hobbes is right.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
     A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his goodness to us.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.3)
     A reaction: Plato's view of goodness is much more absolute than that of religion, as he proposes the Good as the eternal underpinning of nature. I agree with Hobbes that if God is the source of goodness, that will prevent goodness from being truly absolute.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: For an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.6)
     A reaction: Kant's definition of happiness (Idea 1452) seems to be the underlying idea, and hence with the same implication (of impossibility). However, an alcoholic locked in a brewery would seem to have all that Hobbes requires for happiness.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Lust consists of two appetites together, to please, and to be pleased, and the delight men take in delighting is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.IX)
     A reaction: Hobbes would rather burst a blood-vessel than admit any altruism. If you take pleasure in pleasing someone else, why can't that simply be because of the other person's pleasure, with which we sympathise, rather than relishing our own 'power'?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.