Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Phenomenalism' and 'Can there be Vague Objects?'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

16129	Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Evans tries to derive a contradiction from the supposition that a given identity statement is of indeterminate truth-value. (As it happens, I consider that this argument is flawed)
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.3
	A reaction: A priori, I wouldn't expect to be able to settle the question of whether there are any vague objects simply by following some logical derivation. Empirical examination, and conceptual analysis (or stipulation) have to be involved.

16459	Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
	Full Idea: Maybe the world is vague, and vagueness is a necessary feature of any true description of it. Also identities may lack a determinate truth value because of their vagueness. Hence it is a fact that some objects have fuzzy boundaries. But is this coherent?
	From: Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978])
	A reaction: [compressed] Lewis quotes this introduction to the famous short paper, to show that Evans wasn't proposing a poor argument, but offering a reductio of the view that vagueness is 'ontic', or a feature of the world.

16460	Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
	Full Idea: The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
	A reaction: [Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'.

16457	There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
	Full Idea: One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319
	A reaction: Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

14484	If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
	Full Idea: We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6
	A reaction: I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16224	There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
	Full Idea: Two things can't be vaguely identical, because then a would have an indeterminacy which b lacks (namely, being perfectly identical to b), so by Leibniz's Law they can't be identical.
	From: report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978], 4.7) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: [my summary of Katherine Hawley's summary (2001:118) of Evans] Hawley considers the argument to be valid. I have grave doubts about whether b's identity with b is the sort of property needed for an application of Liebniz's Law.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

2614	Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
	Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
	From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

2615	The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
	Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
	From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?