7783
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Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Not only material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be accounted ‘things’.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Things [1995])
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A reaction:
There might be lots of borderline cases here. Is the sky a thing? Is air a thing? How is transparency a thing? Is minus-one a thing? Is an incomplete proposition a thing? Etc.
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15251
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The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
How are we to explain the word 'must' [about causation]? The answer is, I think, that it is either a relic of animism, or else reveals an inclination to treat causal connexion as if it were a form of logical necessity.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [1940], IV.18)
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A reaction:
The animism proposal just about makes sense (as a primitive feature of minds), but why would anyone, if they had the time and understanding, dream of treating a regular connection as a 'logical' necessity?
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