108 ideas
| 9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
| A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
| 20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
| 20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
| A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
| 4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
| A reaction: I think it is vital to hang on to this big definition, focusing on ontology, and not retreat (like Kant) to the epistemological question of how humans happen to see reality, even if we are stuck with being humans. |
| 4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It may well be that after all our attempts at analysis, we have to accept the notions of causality, identity and existence as being primitive and irreducible. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.191) | |
| A reaction: They may be irreducible, but it seems possible that the relationships between them might be revealed (as between Platonic Forms). To exist is to have identity and causal powers? |
| 4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If we think, in a positivistic spirit, that only measurements and observations exist, this is strikingly naïve. The scientists and their instruments can't be composed merely of measurements. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.234) | |
| A reaction: A strong rebuff to crude positivism and 'operationalism'. Such mistakes are the usual confusion of epistemology and ontology. |
| 5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
| A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'. |
| 4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.219) | |
| A reaction: Meaning there are stronger principles of thought which can trump Ockham's Razor. A few more entities won't hurt. Sound right. |
| 21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
| A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist. |
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46 | |
| A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance. |
| 20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity? | |
| From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74 | |
| A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious. |
| 8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
| 20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
| A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
| 8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true. |
| 6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38 | |
| A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc. |
| 4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It appears to be impossible to complete an infinite series of tasks, since such a series has, by definition, no last member. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.290) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints the problem. So are there infinite tasks in a paradox of subdivision like the Achilles? |
| 4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
| A reaction: Intriguing. Sounds wrong to me. At least maths seems to need the idea of the 'correct' answer. If, however, maths is a huge pattern, there is no correctness, just the pattern. We can be wrong, but maths can't be wrong. Ah, I see…! |
| 4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The Peano postulates imply an infinity of numbers, but there are probably not infinitely many concrete objects in existence, so natural numbers must be abstract objects. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
| A reaction: Presumably they are abstract objects even if they aren't universals. 'Abstract' is an essential term in our ontological vocabulary to cover such cases. Perhaps possible concrete objects are infinite. |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372) | |
| A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there. |
| 5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
| A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
| 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59) | |
| A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study? |
| 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'. | |
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view. |
| 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225) | |
| A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way. |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233) | |
| A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well. |
| 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229) | |
| A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is. |
| 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245) | |
| A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events. |
| 21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
| A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
| 16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |
| 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse? |
| 4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The trope theorist holds that the blueness of a blue chair really exists as much as the chair, but is not identified with the blueness of anything else, even if it resembles it exactly. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.361) | |
| A reaction: You are left with explaining how 'resemblance' works if you cannot spot some 'thing' in common. It is an inviting idea, though, because it avoids the ontological baggage of universals. |
| 4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The trope theorist says that a cushion is just a 'bundle' of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.362) | |
| A reaction: Certainly if you dispense with the idea of substance (which is clearly bad science even if it is good metaphysics), something like this is what remains of a cushion, though it sounds more epistemological than ontological. Only philosophers care about this |
| 4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Tropes seem to be abstract entities because, unlike concrete entities, they are ontologically dependent; ..there are no 'free' tropes, and they must always be bundled with other appropriate tropes to exist. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.367) | |
| A reaction: Only a Platonist would think that a universal property could 'exist alone'. I presume Aristotle thought universals were real, though bound up with substances. |
| 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
| A reaction: This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal? |
| 4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists believe that only particulars exist. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.352) | |
| A reaction: A neat definition. Hence they deny universals. I suspect that nominalism is incoherent. Rational thought seems easy to create with universals, impossible with just particulars. Robotics is nominalist, which is why it will fail. |
| 4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Not every meaningful predicate expresses an existing property; thus 'is non-self-exemplifying' cannot refer to a property, because the property would contradict the predicate. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.100) | |
| A reaction: Needs thought. The example is based on Russell's so-called Barber's Paradox. If it can't be a property, can it be a predicate? |
| 4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355) | |
| A reaction: This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals. |
| 4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: For the conventionalist the world is doomed to merge into an amorphous lump with no real individuality or differentiation, ..but we can hardly make our own identity in the world in the way we are supposed to conventionally create identity for objects. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.113) | |
| A reaction: Very nice argument! We need to 'cut nature at the joints' (Plato), and one joint is screamingly obvious - that between observer and world. You could try denying this, but it would be a bizarre view. |
| 16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
| Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
| A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |
| 4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: A statue is a kind of object which cannot survive much change to its shape, unlike a lump of bronze, which cannot survive any change to its material composition. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.70) | |
| A reaction: Also the statue could survive being hollowed out, changing its material composition. Hence a statue is not just a lump of bronze, but we knew that. |
| 16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
| Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175 | |
| A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change? |
| 4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The parts of a ship in a warehouse belong to no ship at all, ..and once they are appropriated by another ship they cease to be parts of the original, ..so it seems that the renovated ship (not the reconstruction) is identified with the original. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.31) | |
| A reaction: The parts in the warehouse could belong to the original (they might even labelled), but assigning them to a new ship does indeed look like a crucial break in the continuity. |
| 4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If we say that up to 5% of a ship's parts can be replaced without the ship ceasing to exist, we could replace 4% and then 4% again, and it would retain its identity, if identity is transitive. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.26) | |
| A reaction: One suspected that all attempts at precision with the ship of Theseus were doomed, but this nicely demonstrates it. |
| 4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If a ship is renovated without reconstruction of original parts, we happily identify the renovation with the original; if there was a reconstruction without the renovated version, we would identify the reconstruction with the original. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.27) | |
| A reaction: This really shakes our belief in identity as a natural rather than mental phenomenon. The existence of clones undermines our normal idea of personal identity. |
| 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles (no two objects can possess exactly the same properties) is not the same as Leibniz's Law (what is true of a thing is true of what is identical with that thing). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.62) | |
| A reaction: Two things can't be the same because we can't discern the difference, which may be our inadequacy. But if they actually have identical properties, it is hard to see how they could be different. A universe with just two perfect spheres is couterexample. |
| 4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning itself depends upon a grasp of possibilities, because a valid argument is one in which it is not possible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.11) | |
| A reaction: A very valuable corrective to my pessimistic view of philosophers' attempts to understand metaphysical necessity. But if we can only grasp natural necessity, then all reason is naturalistic. |
| 4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It may be possible to eliminate the modal operators (in English, 'is possible' and 'is necessary') in favour of quantifier expressions with variables ranging over possible worlds. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.121) | |
| A reaction: Hence 'necessary' becomes 'exists/is true in all possible worlds'. Deep problems, but at least we must show that referring to 'possible' worlds isn't a circular explanation of 'is possible'. |
| 4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Although unfalsifiability is probably a defect in scientific hypothesis, because it is deprived of empirical content, it seems rather to be a virtue in a metaphysical hypothesis. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.241) | |
| A reaction: Presumably nothing could ever be found to count against a necessary truth. A nice point. 'Find me an instance where 2+2 is not 4'. |
| 4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: There are some entities which exist in time and space (such as persons or social groups) of which the behaviour seems to be subject to rational rather than merely causal explanation. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This begs of the question of whether 'rational' can be reduced to causal. We can't manage causal explanations of the very complex, so we use broad-brush second-best explanations? |
| 1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69 | |
| A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals. |
| 20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature. | |
| From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c | |
| A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109]. |
| 20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
| A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere. |
| 20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate. | |
| From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e | |
| A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur. |
| 20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148 |
| 20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01 | |
| A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style. |
| 20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30 | |
| A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events. |
| 21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41 | |
| A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'. |
| 5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b | |
| A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes? |
| 4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The centre of mass of the solar system seems to lack causal powers, and so is an abstract object, even though it has a location and movement. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Nice example, with rich ramifications. Abstraction is deeply tied into our understanding of the physical world, and our concept of identity. |
| 4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Concrete objects possess causal powers and relations, but abstract objects are incapable of having causal powers or relations. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Is this an observation or a definition? One might claim that an abstraction (such as a political ideal) can acquire causal power through a conscious mnd. |
| 20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
| A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
| 20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111 | |
| A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions. |
| 20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
| A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |
| 3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59 |
| 20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11 | |
| A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you? |
| 20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
| A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this. |
| 3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66 | |
| A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just. |
| 20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature? | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e | |
| A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it. |
| 20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a | |
| A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us. |
| 5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d | |
| A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth). |
| 1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60 | |
| A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though. |
| 5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d | |
| A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean. |
| 20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103 | |
| A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd. |
| 5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
| A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
| 5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
| A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
| 20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
| A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
| 5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
| A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
| 20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
| A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |
| 20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
| A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
| 1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
| A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
| 20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |
| 20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
| A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful. |
| 21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
| Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2 | |
| A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body. |
| 20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c | |
| A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them. |
| 5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c | |
| A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism. |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
| 4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: You can't include in your concept of causation a clause stipulating that the cause occurred earlier than the effect, because that would rule out backward causation by definition. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.176) | |
| A reaction: It may, though, be the case that backward causes can't occur, and time is essential to causes. The problem is our inability to know this for sure. |
| 4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.173) | |
| A reaction: This is slippery ground because both 'facts' and 'events' have uncertain ontological status, and seem partly conventional rather than natural. Events might be natural surges or transformations of energy? |
| 4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It seems proper to say that events of themselves possess no causal powers; only persisting objects (individual substances) possess causal powers. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.211) | |
| A reaction: This requires events to be reduced to substances, which invites Aristotle's question of where the movement comes from. In physcis, 'energy' is the key concept. |
| 4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179) | |
| A reaction: Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions. |
| 4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Causation relations between events may an instance of a causal law, with laws either interpreted as constant conjunctions (Hume), or as necessitation among universals (Armstrong). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.190) | |
| A reaction: Hume's version is a thin idea of a law, but we can dream about the metaphysical status of laws, even if we don't know much about them. Lowe says a cause without a law is perfectly intelligible. |
| 4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: One thing Hume has taught us is that the necessity which causation involves is at most 'natural' or 'physical' necessity, not metaphysical necessity. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.182) | |
| A reaction: Given Hume's epistemological scepticism, I don't think he would claim to have shown such a thing. See G.Strawson's book. Metaphysical necessity of causation is possible, but unknowable. |
| 14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: For Lowe law statements are in a sense about what 'ought' to be the case. The 'ought' is not an explicitly moral or anthropomorphic one but instead tells us what is the natural behaviour of kind members. | |
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 8.6 | |
| A reaction: This is the 'normative' view of laws (as opposed to the intentional, dispositional, or regularity accounts). They cite Lowe 1989 Ch.8. The obvious immediate problem is things which evolved for one purpose and end up being used for another. |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactual analyses of event causation don't seem to work, because 'if Napoleon hadn't been born he wouldn't have died' is true, but doesn't mean his birth caused his death. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.161) | |
| A reaction: Nice counterexample, which looks pretty conclusive. Birth makes death possible; it creates the necessary conditions within which it can be caused. |
| 4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If motion just is change of distance between two objects, it does not involve any kind of intrinsic change in the objects in question. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.242) | |
| A reaction: It sound respectably relativistic, but I doubt the definition. x is moving relative to y, then y attains x's velocity, so x ceases to move? Maybe. |
| 4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space at all, but just 'limits' of certain kinds, and as such 'abstract' entities. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.254) | |
| A reaction: This is fairly crucial when dealing with Zeno's paradoxes. How many points in a line? How long to get through a point? |
| 4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If space does not exist at all, but is only relations between objects, what could one possibly mean by saying that there is a place which is unoccupied by any material object? And what determines whether space is bounded? | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.264) | |
| A reaction: Correct. People who assert that space is only relational have been misled by what we can know about space, not what it is. |
| 20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it). |
| 20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist. |
| 20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819. |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
| A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |
| 3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72 |
| 20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
| A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees? |
| 5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
| A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy. |
| 3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53 |
| 1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68 |
| 20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind. |
| 21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5 | |
| A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective. |