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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intuitionism and Formalism' and 'The World as Will and Idea'

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108 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8
     A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there?
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121
     A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027)
     A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree.
Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68)
     A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics).
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a
     A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5
     A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science?
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c
     A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8
     A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46
     A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity?
     From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74
     A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic).
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81
     A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: Not to the mathematician, but to the psychologist, belongs the task of explaining why ...we are averse to so-called contradictory systems in which the negative as well as the positive of certain propositions are valid.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.79)
     A reaction: Was the turning point of Graham Priest's life the day he read this sentence? I don't agree. I take the principle of non-contradiction to be a highly generalised observation of how the world works (and Russell agrees with me).
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38
     A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: A large part of the natural laws introduced by science treat only of the mutual relations between the results of counting and measuring.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.77)
     A reaction: His point, I take it, is that the higher reaches of numbers have lost touch with the original point of the system. I now see the whole issue as just depending on conventions about the agreed extension of the word 'number'.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: The intuitionist recognises only the existence of denumerable sets.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80)
     A reaction: That takes you up to omega, but not beyond, presumably because it then loses sight of the original intuition of 'bare two-oneness' (Idea 12453). I sympathise, but the word 'number' has shifted its meaning a lot these days.
Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: Neo-intuitionism sees the falling apart of moments, reunited while remaining separated in time, as the fundamental phenomenon of human intellect, passing by abstracting to mathematical thinking, the intuition of bare two-oneness.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80)
     A reaction: [compressed] A famous and somewhat obscure idea. He goes on to say that this creates one and two, and all the finite ordinals.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp)
     A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus
     A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
     A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
     Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48
     A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
     Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175
     A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change?
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent.
     From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds.
The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001)
     A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present).
We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004)
     A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: All perception is intellectual.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004)
     A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69
     A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will'
     A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!).
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54)
     A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature.
     From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c
     A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109].
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c
     A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere.
We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55)
     A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate.
     From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e
     A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur.
Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023)
     A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation.
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01
     A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style.
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30
     A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events.
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41
     A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b
     A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
     Full Idea: The concern of mathematical intuitionists was that the use of certain forms of inference generates, not contradiction, but unjustified assertions.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6
     A reaction: This seems to be the real origin of the verificationist idea in the theory of meaning. It is a hugely revolutionary idea - that ideas are not only ruled out of court by contradiction, but that there are other criteria which should also be met.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65
     A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018)
     A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal
     From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42]
     A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot.
Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111
     A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp)
     A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22
     A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5
     A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5
     A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner]
     Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3
     A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too.
Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41)
     A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial'
     A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics....
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11
     A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
     A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66
     A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature?
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e
     A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a
     A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us.
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13
     A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?"
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d
     A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60
     A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though.
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d
     A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029)
     A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103
     A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear".
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e
     A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f
     A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence.
Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127
     A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes.
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89
     A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128
     A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66
     A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens?
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129
     A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60)
     A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!).
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
     A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
     Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2
     A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body.
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c
     A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them.
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
     A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f
     A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c
     A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist.
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c
     A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c
     A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy.
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63)
     A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3
     A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5
     A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective.