123 ideas
| 9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
| A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
| 20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
| 20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
| A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
| 14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The is of 'Socrates is human' expresses the relation of subject and predicate; the is of 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity. It is a disgrace to the human race that it employs the same word 'is' for these entirely different ideas. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
| A reaction: Does the second one express identity? It sounds more like membership to me. 'Socrates is the guy with the hemlock' is more like identity. |
| 5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
| A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'. |
| 14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The definition of a class or collection which enumerates is called a definition by 'extension', and one which mentions a defining property is called a definition by 'intension'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
| A reaction: In ordinary usage we take intensional definitions for granted, so it is interesting to realise that you might define 'tiger' by just enumerating all the tigers. But all past tigers? All future tigers? All possible tigers which never exist? |
| 8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed (in his theory of types) that sentences like 'The number two is fond of cream cheese' or 'Procrastination drinks quadruplicity' should be regarded as not false but meaningless. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the notion of a 'category mistake', which Ryle made famous. The problem is always poetry, where abstractions can be reified, or personified, and meaning can be squeezed out of almost anything. |
| 21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: True future events cannot be such as do not possess causes on account of which they will happen; therefore that which is true must possess causes: and so, when the [true future events] happen they will have happened as a result of destiny. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 9.23-8 | |
| A reaction: [exact ref unclear] Presumably the current causes are the truthmakers for the future events, and so the past is the truthmaker of the future, if you are a determinist. |
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46 | |
| A reaction: [in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance. |
| 20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity? | |
| From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74 | |
| A reaction: This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious. |
| 14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We say that an argument a 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) | |
| A reaction: We end up with Tarski defining truth in terms of satisfaction, so we shouldn't get too excited about what he achieved (any more than he got excited). |
| 14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Some moods of the syllogism are fallacious, e.g. 'Darapti': 'All M is S, all M is P, therefore some S is P', which fails if there is no M. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) | |
| A reaction: This critique rests on the fact that the existential quantifier entails some existence, but the universal quantifier does not. |
| 8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| Full Idea: In Stoic logic propositions are treated the way atoms are treated in present-day chemistry, where the focus is on the way atoms fit together to form molecules, rather than on the internal structure of the atoms. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: A nice analogy to explain the nature of Propositional Logic, which was invented by the Stoics (N.B. after Aristotle had invented predicate logic). |
| 20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus has five indemonstrables that do not need demonstration:1) If 1st the 2nd, but 1st, so 2nd; 2) If 1st the 2nd, but not 2nd, so not 1st; 3) Not 1st and 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 4) 1st or 2nd, the 1st, so not 2nd; 5) 1st or 2nd, not 2nd, so 1st. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.80-81 | |
| A reaction: [from his lost text 'Dialectics'; squashed to fit into one quote] 1) is Modus Ponens, 2) is Modus Tollens. 4) and 5) are Disjunctive Syllogisms. 3) seems a bit complex to be an indemonstrable. |
| 14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We know a great deal about a class without enumerating its members …so definition by extension is not necessary to knowledge about a class ..but enumeration of infinite classes is impossible for finite beings, so definition must be by intension. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
| A reaction: Presumably mathematical induction (which keeps apply the rule to extend the class) will count as an intension here. |
| 14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is only one class having a given set of members, whereas there are always many different characteristics by which a given class may be defined. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) |
| 14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity may be enunciated as 'If n be any inductive cardinal number, there is at least one class of individuals having n terms'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIII) | |
| A reaction: So for every possible there exists a set of terms for it. Notice that they are 'terms', not 'objects'. We must decide whether we are allowed terms which don't refer to real objects. |
| 14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is no logical reason against infinite collections, and we are therefore justified, in logic, in investigating the hypothesis that there are such collections. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VIII) |
| 14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We have a class of representatives, who make up our Parliament, one being selected out of each constituency. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
| A reaction: You can rely on Russell for the clearest illustrations of these abstract ideas. He calls the Axiom of Choice the 'Multiplicative' Axiom. |
| 14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The [Axiom of Choice] is also equivalent to the assumption that of any two cardinals which are not equal, one must be the greater. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
| A reaction: It is illuminating for the uninitiated to learn that this result can't be taken for granted (with infinite cardinals). |
| 14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Zermelo has shown that [the Axiom of Choice] is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered, i.e. can be arranged in a series in which every sub-class has a first term (except, of course, the null class). | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
| A reaction: Russell calls Choice the 'Multiplicative' Axiom. |
| 14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Among boots we distinguish left and right, so we can choose all the right or left boots; with socks no such principle suggests itself, and we cannot be sure, without the [Axiom of Choice], that there is a class consisting of one sock from each pair. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
| A reaction: A deservedly famous illustration of a rather tricky part of set theory. |
| 14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility says 'There is a type of a-functions such that, given any a-function, it is formally equivalent to some function of the type in question'. ..It involves all that is really essential in the theory of classes. But is it true? | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
| A reaction: I take this to say that in the theory of types, it is possible to reduce each level of type down to one type. |
| 14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is right (in its main lines) to say that there is a reduction of propositions nominally about classes to propositions about their defining functions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
| A reaction: The defining functions will involve the theory of types, in order to avoid the paradoxes of naïve set theory. This is Russell's strategy for rejecting the existence of sets. |
| 8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Russell's solution (in the theory of types) consists of restricting the principle that every predicate has a set as its extension so that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: There might be a chicken-and-egg problem here. How do you decide the members of a set (apart from ostensively) without deciding the predicate(s) that combine them? |
| 8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The symbols for classes are mere conveniences, not representing objects called 'classes'. Classes are in fact logical fictions; they cannot be regarded as part of the ultimate furniture of the world. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], Ch.18), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 | |
| A reaction: I agree. For 'logical fictions' read 'abstractions'. To equate abstractions with fictions is to underline the fact that they are a human creation. They are either that or platonic objects - there is no middle way. |
| 14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is part of the definition of logic that all its propositions are completely general. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) |
| 14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Logic has become more mathematical, and mathematics has become more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two; in fact, the two are one. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be true even if you reject logicism about mathematics. Logicism is sometimes rejected because it always ends up with a sneaky ontological commitment, but maybe mathematics shares exactly the same commitment. |
| 8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| Full Idea: Modus ponens is just one of the five different inference rules identified by the Stoics. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Modus ponens strikes me as being more like a definition of implication than a 'rule'. Implication is what gets you from one truth to another. All the implications of a truth must also be true. |
| 10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
| Full Idea: No proposition of logic can assert 'existence' except under a hypothesis. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
| A reaction: I am prepared to accept this view fairly dogmatically, though Musgrave shows some of the difficulties of the if-thenist view (depending on which 'order' of logic is being used). |
| 12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea and am very sympathetic to it. The rival view seems to be that logic is purely conventional, perhaps defined by truth tables etc. It is hard to see how a connective like 'tonk' could be self-evidently silly if it wasn't 'unnatural'. |
| 14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Logical propositions are such as can be known a priori, without study of the actual world. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
| A reaction: This remark constrasts strikingly with Idea 12444, which connects logic to the actual world. Is it therefore a priori synthetic? |
| 6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: We hold fast to the position, defended by Chrysippus, that every proposition is either true or false. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 38 | |
| A reaction: I am intrigued to know exactly how you defend this claim. It may depend what you mean by a proposition. A badly expressed proposition may have indeterminate truth, quite apart from the vague, the undecidable etc. |
| 14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
| Full Idea: When we ask whether Homer existed, we are using the word 'Homer' as an abbreviated description. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree with Russell over this rather unusual example. It doesn't seem so plausible when Ottiline refers to 'Bertie'. |
| 10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
| Full Idea: Russell clearly anticipated Donnellan when he said proper names can also be used as descriptions, adding that 'there is nothing in the phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], p.175) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L1 | |
| A reaction: This seems also to anticipate Strawson's flexible and pragmatic approach to these things, which I am beginning to think is correct. |
| 14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We can even say that, in all such knowledge as can be expressed in words, with the exception of 'this' and 'that' and a few other words of which the meaning varies on different occasions - no names occur, but what seem like names are really descriptions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
| A reaction: I like the caveat about what is expressed in words. Russell is very good at keeping non-verbal thought in the picture. This is his famous final reduction of names to simple demonstratives. |
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In all knowledge that can be expressed in words - with the exception of "this" and "that", and a few other such words - no genuine proper names occur, but what seem like genuine proper names are really descriptions | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
| A reaction: This is the terminus of Russell's train of thought about descriptions. Suppose you point to something non-existent, like a ghost in a misty churchyard? You'd be back to the original problem of naming a non-existent! |
| 14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In 'I met a unicorn' the four words together make a significant proposition, and the word 'unicorn' is significant, …but the two words 'a unicorn' do not form a group having a meaning of its own. It is an indefinite description describing nothing. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) |
| 14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We wish to say that when two straight lines cross each other they have a point in common, but if the series of points on a line were similar to the series of ratios, the two lines might cross in a 'gap' and have no point in common. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], X) | |
| A reaction: You can make a Dedekind Cut in the line of ratios (the rationals), so there must be gaps. I love this idea. We take for granted intersection at a point, but physical lines may not coincide. That abstract lines might fail also is lovely! |
| 14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Every generalisation of number has presented itself as needed for some simple problem. Negative numbers are needed to make subtraction always possible; fractions to make division always possible; complex numbers to make solutions of equations possible. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VII) | |
| A reaction: Doesn't this rather suggest that we made them up? If new problems turn up, we'll invent another lot. We already have added 'surreal' numbers. |
| 13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: Russell toyed with the idea that there is nothing to being a natural number beyond occurring in a progression | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], p.8) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 5 | |
| A reaction: How could you define a progression, without a prior access to numbers? - Arrange all the objects in the universe in ascending order of mass. Use scales to make the selection. Hence a finite progression, with no numbers! |
| 14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is no maximum to the ratios whose square is less than 2, and no minimum to those whose square is greater than 2. This division of a series into two classes is called a 'Dedekind Cut'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VII) |
| 14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A complex number may be regarded and defined as simply an ordered couple of real numbers | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VII) |
| 14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The discovery that 1 is a number must have been difficult. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) | |
| A reaction: Interesting that he calls it a 'discovery'. I am tempted to call it a 'decision'. |
| 14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We want our numbers to be such as can be used for counting common objects, and this requires that our numbers should have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain formal properties. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) | |
| A reaction: Why would just having certain formal properties be insufficient for counting? You just need an ordered series of unique items. It isn't just that we 'want' this. If you define something that we can't count with, you haven't defined numbers. |
| 14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The usual formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative Law [a+b=b+a and axb=bxa], the Associative Law [(a+b)+c=a+(b+c) and (axb)xc=ax(bxc)], and the Distributive Law [a(b+c)=ab+ac)]. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], IX) |
| 14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The nature of infinity and continuity belonged in former days to philosophy, but belongs now to mathematics. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], Pref) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to disagree, since mathematicians since Cantor have revealed so much about infinite numbers (through set theory), but I think it remains an open question whether philosophers have anything distinctive to contribute. |
| 14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Order must be defined by means of a transitive relation, since only such a relation is able to leap over an infinite number of intermediate terms. ...Without it we would not be able to define the order of magnitude among fractions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], IV) |
| 14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Given any series which is endless, contains no repetitions, has a beginning, and has no terms that cannot be reached from the beginning in a finite number of steps, we have a set of terms verifying Peano's axioms. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) |
| 14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| Full Idea: That '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by means of Peano's five axioms, but must be independently understood. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) |
| 12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: On saying that a particular number exists, we are not saying that there is something identical to it, but saying something about its status as a genuine constituent of the world. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.168) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Frege's criterion of identity, which is to be an element in an identity relation, such as x = y. Fine suggests that this only gives a 'trivial' notion of existence, when he is interested in a 'thick' sense of 'exists'. |
| 14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The number 3 is something which all trios have in common, and which distinguishes them from other collections. A number is something that characterises certain collections, namely, those that have that number. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
| A reaction: This is a verbal summary of the Fregean view of numbers, which marks the arrival of set theory as the way arithmetic will in future be characterised. The question is whether set theory captures all aspects of numbers. Does it give a tool for counting? |
| 14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
| Full Idea: What matters in mathematics is not the intrinsic nature of our terms, but the logical nature of their interrelations. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
| A reaction: If they have an instrinsic nature, that would matter far more, because that would dictate the interrelations. Structuralism seems to require that they don't actually have any intrinsic nature. |
| 12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is not implausible that before the 'introduction' of complex numbers, it would have been incorrect for mathematicians to claim that there was a solution to the equation 'x^2 = -1' under a completely unrestricted understanding of 'there are'. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009]) | |
| A reaction: I have adopted this as the crucial test question for anyone's attitude to platonism in mathematics. I take it as obvious that complex numbers were simply invented so that such equations could be dealt with. They weren't 'discovered'! |
| 12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Arguments such as the dispensability argument are attempting to show something about the essentially non-numerical character of physical reality, rather than something about the nature or non-existence of the numbers themselves. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.160) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Hartry Field. If Quine was right, and we only believe in numbers because of our science, and then Field shows our science doesn't need it, then Fine would be wrong. Quine must be wrong, as well as Field. |
| 14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'Ten men' is grammatically the same form as 'white men', so that 10 might be thought to be an adjective qualifying 'men'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
| A reaction: The immediate problem, as Frege spotted, is that such expressions can be rephrased to remove the adjective (by saying 'the number of men is ten'). |
| 13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
| Full Idea: Russell's own stand was that numbers are really only sets of equivalent sets. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919]) by Paul Benacerraf - Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) p.168 | |
| A reaction: Benacerraf is launching a nice attack on this view, based on our inability to grasp huge numbers on this basis, or to see their natural order. |
| 14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is always unavoidably something psychological about inference. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
| A reaction: Glad to find Russell saying that. Only pure Fregeans dream of a logic that rises totally above the minds that think it. See Robert Hanna on the subject. |
| 14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
| A reaction: This is the motivation behind Russell's theory of definite descriptions, and epitomises the approach to ontology through language. Sounds wrong to me! |
| 12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The most natural reading of 'electrons exist' is that there are electrons while, on our view, the proper reading should be modeled on 'electrons spin', meaning every electron spins. 'Exists' should be treated as a predicate rather than a quantifier. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167) | |
| A reaction: So existence IS a predicate (message to Kant). Dunno. Electrons have to exist in order to spin, but they don't have to exist in order to exist. But they don't have to exist to be 'dead'. |
| 12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Just as one can extend the domain of discourse to include solutions to the equation 'x^2=-1' so one can extend the domain of discourse to include objects that satisfy the condition 'x is the sum of the G's' or 'x is a temporal part of the object b at t'. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.164) | |
| A reaction: This thought lies behind Fine's 'Proceduralism'. I take it that our collection of abstracta consists entirely of items we have either deliberately or unthinkingly 'introduced' into our discourse when they seemed useful. They then submit to certain laws. |
| 5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
| A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
| 12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The real objects are the objects of reality, those that figure in the facts by which reality is constituted. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.172) | |
| A reaction: And these need to be facts over and above the basic facts. Thus, does the 'equator' constitute reality, over and above the Earth being a rotating sphere? Does 'six' constitute reality, over and above all the possible groups of six objects? |
| 12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Being the case in reality and being fundamental are not sufficient for one another. If one agrees with Thales that the world is composed of water, and with Aristotle that water is indefinitely divisible, then water would be real but not fundamental. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the divisibility would make a reductionist account of water possible. The Atlantic Ocean is real, but water molecules would have a more prominent place in the ontology of any good metaphysician. |
| 12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We need to straddle both of Carnap's internal and external views. It is only by standing outside of reality that we are able to occupy a standpoint from which the constitution of reality can be adequately described. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 4840! I thoroughly approve of this idea, which almost amounts to a Credo for the modern metaphysician. Since we can think outside our room, or our country, or our era, or our solar system, I think we can do what Fine is demanding. |
| 14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Classes may be regarded as logical fictions, manufactured out of defining characteristics. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II n1) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this. The idea that in addition to the members there is a further object, the set containing them, is absurd. Sets are a tool for thinking about the world. |
| 21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
| A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
| 12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: I suggest we give up on the account of ontological claims in terms of existential quantification. The commitment to the integers is not an existential but a universal commitment, to each of the integers, not to some integer or other. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167) | |
| A reaction: In classical logic it is only the existential quantifier which requires the domain to be populated, so Fine is more or less giving up on classical logic as a tool for doing ontology (apparently?). |
| 16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |
| 14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is obvious that a relation which is symmetrical and transitive must be reflexive throughout its domain. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 13543! The relation will return to its originator via its neighbours, rather than being directly reflexive? |
| 14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The relation of 'asymmetry' is incompatible with the converse. …The relation 'husband' is asymmetrical, so that if a is the husband of b, b cannot be the husband of a. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], V) | |
| A reaction: This is to be contrasted with 'non-symmetrical', where there just happens to be no symmetry. |
| 16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
| Full Idea: If two individuals occupied one substance …let one individual (Dion) be thought of as whole-limbed, the other (Theon) as minus one foot. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated. Theon is the stronger candidate to have perished. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Philo (Alex) - On the Eternity of the World 48 | |
| A reaction: [SVF 2.397 - from Chrysippus's lost 'On the Growing Argument'] This is the original of Tibbles the Cat. Dion must persist to change, and then ousts Theon (it seems). Philo protests at Theon ceasing to exist when nothing has happened to him. |
| 14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The essence of individuality always eludes words and baffles description, and is for that very reason irrelevant to science. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
| A reaction: [context needed for a full grasp of this idea] Russell seems to refer to essence as much as to individuality. The modern essentialist view is that essences are not beyond description after all. Fundamental physics is clearer now than in 1919. |
| 16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
| Full Idea: The Growing Argument said any change of matter is a change of identity. Chrysippus presents it with a case (Dion and Theon) where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity, since the diminished footless Dion survives. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary 28:175 | |
| A reaction: [The example, in Idea 16058, is the original of Tibbles the Cat] This is a lovely bold idea which I haven't met in the modern discussions - that identity actually requires change. The concept of identity is meaningless without change? |
| 12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In order that it be valid to infer q from p, it is only necessary that p should be true and that the proposition 'not-p or q' should be true. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt points out that this approach to logical consequences is a denial of any modal aspect, such as 'logical necessity'. Russell observes that for a good inference you must know the disjunction as a whole. Could disjunction be modal?... |
| 14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is no need to admit as a fundamental notion any form of implication not expressible as a truth-function. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
| A reaction: Note that this is from a book about 'mathematical' philosophy. Nevertheless, it seems to have the form of a universal credo for Russell. He wasn't talking about conditionals here. Maybe conditionals are not implications (in isolation, that is). |
| 14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Saying that the axiom of reducibility is logically necessary is what would be meant by saying that it is true in all possible worlds. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
| A reaction: This striking remark is a nice bridge between Leibniz (about whom Russell wrote a book) and Kripke. |
| 14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We know that certain scientific propositions - often expressed in mathematical symbols - are more or less true of the world, but we are very much at sea as to the interpretation to be put upon the terms which occur in these propositions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
| A reaction: Enter essentialism, say I! Russell's remark is pretty understandable in 1919, but I don't think the situation has changed much. The problem of interpretation may be of more interest to philosophers than to physicists. |
| 1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: A dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without pausing to smell. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.69 | |
| A reaction: As we might say: either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C. I wouldn't want to trust this observation without a lot of analysis of slow-motion photography of dogs as crossroads. Even so, it is a nice challenge to Descartes' view of animals. |
| 20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature. | |
| From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c | |
| A reaction: This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109]. |
| 20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus argues against the 'swerve' of the Epicureans, on the grounds that they are doing violence to nature by positing something which is uncaused, and cites dice or scales, which can't settle differently without some cause or difference. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c | |
| A reaction: That is, the principle of sufficient reason (or of everything having a cause) is derived from observation, not a priori understanding. Pace Leibniz. As in modern discussion, free will or the swerve only occur in our minds, and not elsewhere. |
| 20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus's accounts of possibility and fate are in conflict. If he is right that 'everything that permits of occurring even if it is not going to occur is possible', then many things are possible which are not according to fate. | |
| From: comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1055e | |
| A reaction: A palpable hit, I think. Plutarch refers to Chrysippus's rejection of Diodorus Cronus's Master Argument. Fatalism seems to entail that the only future possibilities are the ones that actually occur. |
| 20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his 'On Fate') that everything happens by fate. Fate is a continuous string of causes of things which exist or a rational principle according to which the cosmos is managed. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.148 |
| 20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Fate is a sempiternal and unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed and compounded. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.01 | |
| A reaction: It seems that Chrysippus (called by Aulus Gellius 'the chief Stoic philosopher') had a rather grandly rhetorical prose style. |
| 20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus responded to the Lazy Argument (that the outcome of an illness is fated, so there is no point in calling the doctor) by saying 'calling the doctor is fated just as much as recovering', which he calls 'co-fated'. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 28-30 | |
| A reaction: From a pragmatic point of view, this idea also nullifies fatalism, since you can plausibly fight against your fate to your last breath. No evidence could ever be offered in support of fatalism, not even the most unlikely events. |
| 21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Some causes are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 18.41 | |
| A reaction: This move is described by Cicero as enabling Chrysippus to 'escape necessity and to retain fate'. |
| 5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b | |
| A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes? |
| 20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
| A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
| 14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We mean by 'proposition' primarily a form of words which expresses what is either true or false. I say 'primarily' because I do not wish to exclude other than verbal symbols, or even mere thoughts if they have a symbolic character. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) | |
| A reaction: I like the last bit, as I think of propositions as pre-verbal thoughts, and I am sympathetic to Fodor's 'language of thought' thesis, that there is a system of representations within the brain. |
| 20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111 | |
| A reaction: This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions. |
| 20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: He who makes moral progress to the highest degree performs all the appropriate actions in all circumstances, and omits none. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Sophocles - Sophocles' Electra 4.39.22 | |
| A reaction: Hence concerns about omission as well as commission in the practice of ethics can be seen in the light of character and virtue. The world is fully of nice people who act well, but don't do so well on omissions. Car drivers, for example. |
| 3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics say the beautiful is the only good. Good is an equivalent term to the beautiful; since a thing is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore it is good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.59 |
| 20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11 | |
| A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you? |
| 20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
| A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this. |
| 3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66 | |
| A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just. |
| 20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature? | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e | |
| A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it. |
| 20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a | |
| A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us. |
| 5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d | |
| A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth). |
| 1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60 | |
| A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though. |
| 5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d | |
| A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean. |
| 20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103 | |
| A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd. |
| 5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
| A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
| 5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
| A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
| 20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
| A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
| 5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
| A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
| 20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
| A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |
| 20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
| A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
| 1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
| A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
| 20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |
| 20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37 | |
| A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful. |
| 21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
| Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2 | |
| A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body. |
| 20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c | |
| A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them. |
| 5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c | |
| A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism. |
| 20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: When he wished to be subtle, Chrysippus wrote that the past part of time and the future part do not exist but subsist, and only the present exists. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081f | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Void] I think I prefer the ontology of Idea 20818. Idea 20819 does not offer an epistemology. Is the present substantial enough to be known? The word 'subsist' is an ontological evasion (even though Russell briefly relied on it). |
| 20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Stoics do not allow a minimal time to exist, and do not want to have a partless 'now'; so what one thinks one has grasped as present is in part future and in part past. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1081c | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Parts Bk3-5] I agree with the ontology here, but I take our grasp of the present to be very short-term memory of the past. I ignore special relativity. Chrysippus expressed two views about this; in the other one he was a Presentist. |
| 20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says most clearly that no time is wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite, time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility by this method of division. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: But what is his reason for thinking that time is a continuous thing? There is a minimum time in quantum mechanics (the Planck Time), but do these quantum intervals overlap? Compare Idea 20819. |
| 3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics say that God is an animal immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world; however, he is not the figure of a man, and is the creator of the universe. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.72 |
| 20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: One can find no other starting point or origin for justice except the one derived from Zeus and that derived from the common nature; for everything like this must have that starting point, if we are going to say anything at all about good and bad things. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
| A reaction: [in lost 'On Gods' bk 3] This appears to offer two starting points, in the mind of Zeus, and in nature, though since nature is presumed to be rational the two may run together. Is Zeus the embodiment, or the unconscious source, or the maker of decrees? |
| 5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 326), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035c | |
| A reaction: If the source is 'universal nature', that could agree with Plato, but if the source is Zeus, then stoicism is a religion rather than a philosophy. |
| 3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics teach that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Zeus, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.53 |
| 1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stoics teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate, and Jupiter, and by many names besides. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.68 |
| 20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Death is a separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body. For neither does anything incorporeal touch a body, and the soul touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not incorporeal. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Tertullian - The Soul as an 'Astral Body' 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This is the classic interaction difficulty for substance dualist theories of mind. |
| 21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a rationale [logos] peculiar to itself: for in a sense it occurs in accordance with universal reason, and is not without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be no good. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.5 | |
| A reaction: [a quotation from Chrysippus. Plutarch, Comm Not 1065b] A nice question about any terrible disaster is whether it is in some way 'useful', if we take a broader view of things. Almost everything has a good aspect, from that perspective. |