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All the ideas for 'works', 'Words without Objects' and 'Twilight of the Idols'

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84 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro
     A reaction: The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea.
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Ages are to be assessed by their positive forces - and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last great age.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.37)
     A reaction: I suspect that Nietzsche places art very high among the positive forces. Science and technology showed barely a glimmer during the Renaissance. Mathematics moved very little, Copernicus was ignored, and logic was static.
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I set apart with high reverence the name of Heraclitus.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.2)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. …Sophist culture, by which I mean realist culture, attains in him its perfect expression.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 9.2)
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.7)
     A reaction: Nice. At its deepest level thinking isn't a rational process?
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 26)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle logos is the ability to speak rationally about, with the hope of attaining knowledge, questions of value.
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.26
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' derives.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.04)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: With dialectics the rabble gets on top.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
     Full Idea: A real definition, according to the Aristotelian tradition, gives the essence of the kind of thing defined. Man is defined as a rational animal, and thus rationality and animality are of the essence of each of us.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Willard Quine - Vagaries of Definition p.51
     A reaction: Compare Idea 4385. Personally I prefer the Aristotelian approach, but we may have to say 'We cannot identify the essence of x, and so x cannot be defined'. Compare 'his mood was hard to define' with 'his mood was hostile'.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle, to give a definition one must first state the genus and then the differentia of the kind of thing to be defined.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.157
     A reaction: Presumably a modern definition would just be a list of properties, but Aristotle seeks the substance. How does he define a genus? - by placing it in a further genus?
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: What has first to have itself proved is of little value.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05)
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Aristotle proposes to relativise unity and plurality, so that a single object can be both one (indivisible) and many (divisible) simultaneously, without contradiction, relative to different measures. Wholeness has degrees, with the strength of the unity.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.12
     A reaction: [see Koslicki's account of Aristotle for details] As always, the Aristotelian approach looks by far the most promising. Simplistic mechanical accounts of how parts make wholes aren't going to work. We must include the conventional and conceptual bit.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
     Full Idea: Aristotle apparently believed that the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected the substance-accident nature of reality.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4
     A reaction: We need not assume that Aristotle is wrong. It is a chicken-and-egg. There is something obvious about subject-predicate language, if one assumes that unified objects are part of nature, and not just conventional.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: If a plural variable is said to have not a single value but some values (some clothes), then a non-count variable may have, more quirkier still, some value (some clothing, for instance) in ranging arbitrarily over the scattered stuff.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 4.4)
     A reaction: We seem to need the notion of a sample, or an archetype, to fit the bill. I hereby name them 'sample variables'. Damn - Laycock got there first, on p.137.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Plurality is a semantical but not also an ontological construction.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4)
     A reaction: I love it when philososphers make simple and illuminating remarks like this. You could read 500 pages of technical verbiage about plural reference without grasping that this is the underlying issue. Sounds right to me.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The very words we class as non-count nouns may themselves be used for counting, of kinds or types, and phrases like 'several wines' are perfectly in order. ...Not only do we have 'less cheese', but we also have the non-generic 'fewer cheeses'.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n23)
     A reaction: [compressed] Laycock generally endorses the thought that what can be counted is not simply distinguished by a precise class of applied vocabulary. He offers lots of borderline or ambiguous cases in his footnotes.
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Some words that seem to be semantically non-count can take syntactically plural forms: 'snows', 'sands', 'waters' and the like.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n24)
     A reaction: This seems to involve parcels of the stuff. The 'snows of yesteryear' occur at different times. 'Taking the waters' probably involves occasions. The 'Arabian sands' presumably occur in different areas. Semantics won't fix what is countable.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The characteristics which have been assigned to the 'real being' of things are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness - the 'real world has been constructed out of the contradiction of the actual world.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6)
     A reaction: I take this to be a critique of Hegel, in particular. Could we describe the metaphysics of Nietzsche as 'constructivist'? I certainly think he is underrated as a metaphysician, because the ideas are so fragmentary.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Being is everywhere thought in, foisted on, as cause; it is only from the conception 'ego' that there follows, derivatively, the concept 'being'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5)
     A reaction: 'Being' is such a remote abstraction that I doubt whether we can say anything at all meaningful about where it 'comes from'.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The central fact about the category of stuff or matter is that it is profoundly antithetical to reference.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref)
     A reaction: This is taking 'reference' in the strictly singular classical sense, but clearly we refer to water in various ways. Laycock's challenge is very helpful. We have been in the grips of a terrible orthodoxy.
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The definite descriptions of stuff like water are neither singular descriptions denoting individual mereological aggregates, nor plural descriptions denoting multitudes of discrete units or semantically determined atoms.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 5.3)
     A reaction: Laycock makes an excellent case for this claim, and seems to invite a considerable rethink of our basic ontology to match it, one which he ultimately hints at calling 'romantic'. Nice. Conservatives try to force stuff into classical moulds.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Suppose that water, qua vapour, mixes with the atmosphere. Is there any abstract metaphysical principle, other than that of atomism, which implies that water must, in any such process, retain its identity? That claim seems indefensible.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 1.2 n22)
     A reaction: It can't be right that some stuff always loses its identity in a mixture, if the mixture was in a closed vessel, and then separated again. Dispersion is what destroys the identity, not mixing.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The grounds upon which 'this' world has been designated as apparent establish rather its reality - another kind of reality is absolutely undemonstrable.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6)
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: It is the metaphysics of language (that is, of reason) ....which believes in the 'ego', in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its belief in the ego-substance on to all things - only thus does it create the concept 'thing'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover and of the soul confirms the suspicion that form, when it is not thought of as the object represented in a definition, plays the role of the ultimate mereological atom within his system.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 6.6
     A reaction: Aristotle is concerned with which things are 'divisible', and he cites these two examples as indivisible, but they may be too unusual to offer an actual theory of how Aristotle builds up wholes from atoms. He denies atoms in matter.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Thus in Aristotle we may think of an object's formal components as a sort of recipe for how to build wholes of that particular kind.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 7.2.5
     A reaction: In the elusive business of pinning down what Aristotle means by the crucial idea of 'form', this analogy strikes me as being quite illuminating. It would fit DNA in living things, and the design of an artifact.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The notion of a part is such that parts must be of the same very general type - concrete, material or physical, for instance - as the wholes of which they are (said to be) parts.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 2.9)
     A reaction: The phrase 'same very general type' cries out for investigation. Can an army contain someone who isn't much of a soldier? Can the Treasury contain a fear of inflation?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
     Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle
     A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.1)
     A reaction: One for McDowell.
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173
     A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5
     A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
     Full Idea: Plato's unity of science principle states that all - legitimate - sciences are ultimately about the Forms. Aristotle's principle states that all sciences must be, ultimately, about substances, or aspects of substances.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], 1) by Julius Moravcsik - Aristotle on Adequate Explanations 1
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle things which explain (the explanantia) are facts, which should not be associated with the modern view that says explanations are dependent on how we conceive and describe the world (where causes are independent of us).
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.1
     A reaction: There must be some room in modern thought for the Aristotelian view, if some sort of robust scientific realism is being maintained against the highly linguistic view of philosophy found in the twentieth century.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: The standard Aristotelian doctrine of species and genus in the theory of anything whatever involves specifying what the thing is in terms of something more general.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
     Full Idea: The view that essential properties are those in virtue of which other significant properties of the subjects under investigation can be explained is encountered repeatedly in Aristotle's work.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Joan Kung - Aristotle on Essence and Explanation IV
     A reaction: What does 'significant' mean here? I take it that the significant properties are the ones which explain the role, function and powers of the object.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. ...First principle: any explanation is better than none. ...Proof by pleasure ('by potency') as criterion of truth.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.5)
     A reaction: By 'proof by pleasure' he means that we find an explanation so satisfying that we cling to it. I assume it is a criterion of rationality (an epistemic virtue) to reject the principle 'any explanation is better than none'. Negative capability.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Work is needed to distinguish abstract nouns ...from the generic uses of what are otherwise concrete nouns. The contrast is that of 'humility is a virtue' and 'water is a liquid'.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n25)
     A reaction: 'Work is needed' implies 'let me through, I'm an analytic philosopher', but I don't think they will separate very easily. What does 'watery' mean? Does water have concrete virtues?
The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The 'highest concepts' ...are the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last fumes of evaporating reality.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4)
     A reaction: This could be seen as an attack on the aspirations of all of philosophy, which seeks general truths out of the chaos of experience. Should we shut up, then, and just be and do?
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The 'individual' ...is an error: he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a 'link in the chain', something merely inherited from the past - he constitutes the entire single line 'man' up to and including himself.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.33)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but you can sort of imagine yourself as a culmination of something, rather than as an isolated entity. I'm not sure how that is supposed to affect my behaviour.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays itself as a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or- be absurdly rational.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.10)
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial'
     A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Some people hold that it is reference, in some more or less full-blooded sense, which constitutes our basic intellectual or psychological connection with the world.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref)
     A reaction: This is the view which Laycock sets out to challenge, by showing that we talk about stuff like water without any singular reference occurring at all. I think he is probably right.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: At the beginning stands the great fateful error that the will is something which produces an effect - that will is a faculty.... Today we know it is merely a word.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5)
     A reaction: This is despite Nietzsche's insistence that 'will to power' is the central fact of active existence. The misreading of Nietzsche is to think that this refers to the conscious exercising of a mental faculty.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The so-called 'motive' is another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness - something alongside the deed which is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deed than to represent them.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.3)
     A reaction: [Leiter gives 'VI.3', but I can't find it] As far as you can get from intellectualism about action, and is more in accord with the picture found in modern neuro-science. No one knows why they are 'interested' in something, and that's the start of it.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Anyone who tried to divorce the beautiful from man's pleasure in man would at once feel the ground give way beneath him. The 'beautiful in itself' is not even a concept, merely a phrase.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.19)
     A reaction: I love the insult 'not even a concept'! It's like Pauli's 'not even wrong'!
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Without music life would be a mistake.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 33)
     A reaction: Cf Schopenhauer in Idea 21469. If you, dear reader, don't love music, then I sincerely hope that there is something in your life which can match it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct for life.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.4)
     A reaction: Sounds right. There is no reasoning against a moral nihilist, because they seem to have no instinct in favour of life. It is the given of morality.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: For philosophers, the higher must not be allowed to grow out of the lower, must not be allowed to have grown at all ...Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4)
     A reaction: This is so deep and central that I wrote a paper on it, advocating that the theory of values should focus of value-makers.
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: An insight formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever. Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.1)
     A reaction: Not only a slogan for non-cognitivism, but also a clear statement of the error theory about morality, a century before John Mackie.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is of finding guilty.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.7)
     A reaction: Michael Frede says free will was invented to feel wholly in charge of our own actions. I doubt whether punishment was the first motive. The will just gives a simple explanation of actions.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The value of life cannot be estimated.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: Military leaders apparently judge that the death of one of their own soldiers is worth between 12 and 20 enemy deaths (so history suggests). How about ransom money?
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5)
     A reaction: I love Nietzsche's ideas about the source of values, and his remarks about the value of life. Other thinkers sound so simplistic in comparison.
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.01)
     A reaction: I guess he was having a bad day. Since the whole universe is clearly 'worthless', this judgement must in some sense be correct. But I love my books.
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: I take his point to be neither that life is unquestionably valuable nor that it is valueless, but that the very question is ridiculous. If we live, we value living. Sounds right.
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against it, can in the last resort never be true.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: I suppose this is in the same spirit as judging whether celery tastes nice. Are you for or against the Moon?
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One would have to be situated outside life ....[and yet know it thoroughly] ....to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5)
     A reaction: Can practising artists question the value of their art? The whole point of objectivity is that we can mentally step 'outside' of something, without actually withdrawing from it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The spiritualization of sensuality is called 'love': it is a great triumph over Christianity.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3)
     A reaction: I'm not quite clear what 'spiritualization' means, particularly when it comes from Nietzsche.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A well-constituted human being, a 'happy one', must perform certain actions and shrink from other actions. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.2)
     A reaction: A nice reversal of basic Aristotle, though Aristotle does say that the truly virtuous person is happy in their actions. Treat unhappy people with caution!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 12)
     A reaction: The Danes keeping being voted the happiest nation, so presumably that results from some sort of effort on their part. The easiest is happiness is to achieve security, then do nothing.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: An 'altruistic' morality, a morality under which egoism languishes - is under all circumstances a bad sign.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.35)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: From the military school of life. - What does not kill me makes me stronger.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 08)
     A reaction: The published version! Perhaps the most famous remark in all of Nietzsche, and no one realises it is ironic! It is a sarcastic remark about the battering ram mentality of the Prussian militarist! He had served in the army.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The invalid is a parasite on society.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36)
     A reaction: I'll skip the rest, but you get the idea. The point (with which I sympathise) is that life is primarily about what healthy people do. Something has gone wrong if all we do is worry about the sick and the suffering.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organise.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39)
     A reaction: Even when Nietzsche is wrong (and who knows, here?) he always challenges you to think!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to centuries-long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding generations.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39)
     A reaction: This sounds like a lovely challenge to Popper, who seems to have been a liberal who pinned his faith on institutions.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'Equality for equals, inequality for unequals' - that would be the true voice of justice.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.48)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One has renounced grand life when one renounces war.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3)
     A reaction: Nietzsche was a medical orderly in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, so he had seen it at first hand. I think the machine gun and the heavy bomber would have changed his attitude to warfare. He sounds a bit silly now. Nostalgia for the Iliad.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it.
     From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE])
     A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead."
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There is a need for educators who are themselves educated.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.5)
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We have no power to prevent ourselves being born: but we can rectify this error - for sometimes it is an error.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
     Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3
     A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2
     A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The supreme concepts of philosophers cannot be incommensurate with one another, be incompatible with one another... Thus they acquired their stupendous concept 'God'.... The last, thinnest, emptiest is placed as the first, as cause in itself.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4)
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We deny God; in denying God we deny accountability; only by doing that do we redeem the world.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8)
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Aristotle said that the conception of gods arose among mankind from two originating causes, namely from events which concern the soul and from celestial phenomena.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE], Frag 10) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Physicists (two books) I.20
     A reaction: The cosmos suggests order, and possible creation. What do events of the soul suggest? It doesn't seem to be its non-physical nature, because Aristotle is more of a functionalist. Puzzling. (It says later that gods are like the soul).
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The primitive church fought against the 'intelligent' in favour of the 'poor in spirit': how could one expect from it an intelligent war against passion?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.1)
Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know what is good for him and what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.05)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: If there is a strong instinct for slandering, disparaging and accusing life within us, then we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of 'another', a 'better' life.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6)