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19090
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If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
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Full Idea:
If we cannot check our language against non-linguistic awareness, then philosophy can never be more than a discussion of the utility and compatibility of beliefs - and, more particularly, of the various vocabularies in which those beliefs are formulated.
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From:
Richard Rorty (Brandom on Social Practices and Representations [1998], iii.127), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.178
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A reaction:
I'm amazed at how many people I encounter in philosophy circles (compared with none at all outside those circles) who seem to think that we cannot check our language against our non-linguistic awareness. Rorty is their guru. Weird.
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22489
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'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
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Full Idea:
Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
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From:
report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
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A reaction:
[In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.
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