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109 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
     Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61
     A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy.
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
     Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01)
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
     Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02)
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03)
     A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense.
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
     Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04)
     A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation.
Aletheia: truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Aletheia: truth
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05)
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
     Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06)
     A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives.
Ananke: necessity [PG]
     Full Idea: Ananke: necessity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07)
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
     Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08)
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
     Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09)
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
     Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10)
     A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element.
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
     Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11)
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
     Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12)
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
     Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13)
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
     Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14)
     A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical.
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
     Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15)
     A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'.
Chronismos: separation [PG]
     Full Idea: Chronismos: separation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16)
Diairesis: division [PG]
     Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17)
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
     Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18)
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
     Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21)
Diaphora: difference [PG]
     Full Idea: Diaphora: difference
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22)
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
     Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23)
     A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation.
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
     Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24)
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
     Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25)
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
     Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26)
     A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
     Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27)
Empeiron: experience [PG]
     Full Idea: Empeiron: experience
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28)
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
     Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power?
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31)
Enkrateia: control [PG]
     Full Idea: Enkrateia: control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32)
     A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled.
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
     Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33)
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34)
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35)
     A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'.
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
     Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36)
Ergon: function [PG]
     Full Idea: Ergon: function, work
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37)
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
     Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38)
     A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly?
Eros: love [PG]
     Full Idea: Eros: love, desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41)
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
     Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42)
     A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure.
Genos: type, genus [PG]
     Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43)
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
     Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44)
Horismos: definition [PG]
     Full Idea: Horismos: definition
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45)
Hule: matter [PG]
     Full Idea: Hule: matter
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46)
     A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'!
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
     Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47)
     A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'.
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
     Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48)
     A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects.
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
     Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51)
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
     Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52)
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
     Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53)
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
     Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54)
Meson: the mean [PG]
     Full Idea: Meson: the mean
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55)
     A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances.
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
     Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56)
     A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic.
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
     Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57)
Morphe: form [PG]
     Full Idea: Morphe: form
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58)
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
     Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59)
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
     Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61)
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62)
     A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19
Orexis: desire [PG]
     Full Idea: Orexis: desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63)
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
     Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia']
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64)
     A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer.
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
     Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65)
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
     Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66)
Philia: friendship [PG]
     Full Idea: Philia: friendship
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67)
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68)
     A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise.
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71)
     A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English.
Physis: nature [PG]
     Full Idea: Physis: nature
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72)
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
     Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73)
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
     Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74)
     A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem.
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
     Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75)
     A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too.
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76)
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77)
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
     Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78)
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
     Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81)
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82)
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
     Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83)
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
     Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84)
Theos: god [PG]
     Full Idea: Theos: god
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85)
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
     Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86)
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
     Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87)
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory.
To ti estin: essence [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti estin: essence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91)
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
     Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
     Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70
     A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv
     A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15
     A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle?
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
     Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
     Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2
     A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3
     A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3
     A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality.
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5
     A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it!
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
     A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?'
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
     Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2
     A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88
     A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12
     A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
     Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never!
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276
     A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
     Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43
     A reaction: anti Charles Taylor
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8
     A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27
     A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
     Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117
     A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
     Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato
     A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato is boring.
     From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated.
     From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.