13 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Analysis makes the statement more complicated than it was; but it cannot and ought not to make it more complicated than its meaning (Bedeutung) was to begin with. When the statement is as complex as its meaning, then it is completely analysed. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 46e) | |
| A reaction: But how do you assess how complex the 'Bedeutung' was before you started? |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake. | |
| From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4 | |
| A reaction: Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine? |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The logical form of the statement must already be given in the forms of its constituents. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 23e) | |
| A reaction: This would evidently require each constituent to have a 'logical form'. It is hard to see what that could beyond its part of speech. Do two common nouns have the same logical form? |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein's 'fundamental idea' is that the 'and' and 'not' which guarantee the truth of "not p and not-p" are meaningful, but do not get their meaning by representing or standing for or referring to some kind of entity; they are non-referring terms. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], §37) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein then defines the terms using truth tables, to show what they do, rather than what they stand for. This seems to me to be a candidate for the single most important idea in the history of the philosophy of logic. |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In order for a proposition to be CAPABLE of making sense, the world must already have the logical structure it has. The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], p.14c) | |
| A reaction: It seems that in Tractatus it is propositions about facts which are true or false, but prior to the facts are substance and the objects, and it is there that we find the logical structure of the world. I see this view as modern stoicism. |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The great problem around which everything turns that I write is: is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in? | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 15.06.01) | |
| A reaction: Morris identifies this as a 'Kantian question'. I trace it back to stoicism. This question has never bothered me. It just seems weird to think that you can infer reality from the examination of your own thinking. Perhaps I should take it more seriously? |
| 19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
| Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter. | |
| From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic. |
| 19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
| Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts. | |
| From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
| A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept. |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of wh9ch psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 1916. 2 Sep), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 58 Intro | |
| A reaction: This is to treat the self as a phenomenon of thought, rather than of a human being. So if a machine could think, would it hence necessarily have a metaphysical self? |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc). | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 14.09.29) | |
| A reaction: [see Tractatus 4.031] This is the first appearance of LW's picture (or model) theory of meaning. It may well be the best theory of meaning anyone has come up with, since meaning being out in the world strikes me as absurd. |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If suicide is allowed, then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed, then suicide is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], end), quoted by Jonathan Glover - Causing Death and Saving Lives §13 | |
| A reaction: This reveals the religious streak in Wittgenstein. I am reluctant to judge suicide, but this seems wrong. Should a 'jumper' worry if they land on someone else and kill them? Of course they should. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |