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22014
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Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard]
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Full Idea:
Schulze said Reinhold and Kant violated their own theory with the thing-in-itself, and that Reinhold was wrong that all consciousnes is representational (since pain isn't), and the self can't represent itself without a regress.
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From:
report of Gottlob Schulze (Aenesidemus [1792]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05
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A reaction:
[my compressed version] This article demolished Reinhold, which is a shame, because if he had responded constructively to these criticisms he might have reached be best theory of his age. These are analytic style objections, by counterexample.
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15956
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The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P]
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Full Idea:
The peripatetic philosophers, in spite of their disagreements, all treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter and not to be understood in material terms.
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From:
Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 54)
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A reaction:
This is the simple reason why hylomorphism became totally discredited, in the face of the 'mechanical philosophy'. But there must be a physical version of hylomorphism, and I don't think Aristotle himself would reject it.
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15975
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Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P]
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Full Idea:
Is there any way of separating the qualities that bodies appear to have into two groups, one as small as possible and the other as large as possible, such that the smaller group can plausibly be used to explain the larger?
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From:
Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 5.02)
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A reaction:
Alexander implies that this is a question Locke asked himself. This is pretty close to what I take to be the main question for essentialism, though I am cautious about couching it in terms of groups of qualities. I think this was Aristotle's question.
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15963
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Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P]
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Full Idea:
The idea of a designed universe has not been utterly irrelevant to the scientific project; it is one of the beliefs that can give a scientist the faith that there are laws, waiting to be discovered, that govern all phenomena.
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From:
Peter Alexander (Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles [1985], 03.3)
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A reaction:
Of course if you start out looking for the 'laws of God' that is probably what you will discover. Natural selection strikes me as significant, because it shows no sign of being a procedure appropriate to a benevolent god.
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