67 ideas
| 2930 | The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The future task of the philosophers is the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§17 note) | |
| A reaction: 'Determine' is presumably either a power struggle, or needs criteria by which to do the judging. |
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The motto of what is presented here is 'less conceptual analysis, more metaphysics', where the distinction is equivalent to the distinction between saying what 'F' means and saying what being F is. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to capture exactly the spirit of metaphysics since Saul Kripke's work, though some people engaged in it seem to me to be trapped in an outdated linguistic view of the matter. Molnar credits Locke as the source of his view. |
| 20143 | Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Strictly speaking there is no knowledge [science] without presuppositions; a philosophy, a 'faith', must always be there first of all, for knowledge to win from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§24) | |
| A reaction: He sees philosophers as the creators of this faith, and laughs at anyone who tries to set philosophy on a scientific basis. |
| 23722 | Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'Objectivity' should be understood not as 'contemplation without interest' (a non-concept and an absurdity), but as having in our power the ability to engage and disengage our 'pros' and 'cons'; we can use the difference in perspectives for knowledge. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12) | |
| A reaction: Note that he will use perspectives to achieve knowledge. The idea that Perspectivalism is mere relativism is labelled as 'extreme' in Idea 4486. He is right that objectivity is a mental capacity and achievement of individuals. |
| 4417 | Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Only that which has no history is definable. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§13) | |
| A reaction: Too subtle to evaluate! It sounds as if it could be right, that some things are definable, but when the accretions of human history are interwoven into an identity, we can forget it. |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: A real definition expresses the sum of the properties that constitute the identity of the thing defined. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a standard modern view among modern essentialists, and one which I believe can come into question. It seems to miss out the fact that an essence will also explain the possible functions and behaviours of a thing. Explanation seems basic. |
| 23715 | Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I hope [psychologists] are actually brave, generous, proud animals, who know how to control their own pleasure and pain and are taught to sacrifice desirability to truth, even a bitter, ugly, unchristian, immoral truth - Because there are such truths. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§01) | |
| A reaction: A nice expression of Nietzsche's values, which makes truth central, contrary to the widespread modern view that he was the high priest of relativism. If you think that, read him more carefully. |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Ontological dependence is better understood in terms of an essential connection, rather than simply a necessary connection. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be an important piece in the essentialist jigsaw. Apart from essentialism, I can't think of any doctrine which offers any sort of explanation of the self-evident fact of certain ontological dependencies. |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The ontologically fundamental categories are three in number: Objects, Properties, and Relations. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 2 Intr) | |
| A reaction: We need second-order logic to quantify over all of these. The challenge to this view might be that it is static, and needs the addition of processes or events. Molnar rejects facts and states of affairs. |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Reflexive relations are, and non-reflexive relations may be, monadic in the ontological sense although they are syntactically polyadic. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.5) | |
| A reaction: I find this a very helpful distinction, as I have never quite understood reflexive relations as 'relations', even in the most obvious cases, such as self-love or self-slaughter. |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: If a priori atomism is a true theory of the world, then all properties are derivative from ultimate properties. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there is a physicalist metaphysic underlying this, which means that even abstract properties derive ultimately from these physical atoms. Unless we want to postulate logical atoms, or monads, or some such weird thing. |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: A property like 'being physical' is just a second-order property. ...It is not required as a first-order property. ...Higher-order properties earn their keep as necessity-makers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.2) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be correct and very important. People who like 'abundant' properties don't make this distinction about orders (of levels of abstraction, I would say), so the whole hierarchy has an equal status in ontology, which is ridiculous. |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The canonical name for a property that is a non-power is 'categorical property'. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 10.2) | |
| A reaction: Molnar objects that this implies that powers cannot be used categorically, and refuses to use the term. There seems to be uncertainty over whether the term refers to necessity, or to the ability to categorise. I'm getting confused myself. |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Are tropes transferable? ...If tropes are not dependent on their bearers, that is a trope-theoretic version of Platonism. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.6) | |
| A reaction: These are the sort of beautifully simple questions that we pay philosophers to come up with. If they are transferable, what was the loose bond which connected them? If they aren't, then what individuates them? |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there remains an I-know-not-what that lurks behind the manifestation, which is beyond our limits of cognizance. The ultimate reality of the world has to be unknowable. |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The basic features of powers are: Directedness (to some outcome); Independence (from their manifestations); Actuality (not mere possibilities); Intrinsicality (not relying on other objects) and Objectivity (rather than psychological). | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: [compression of his list] This offering is why Molnar's book is important, because no one else seems to get to grips with trying to pin down what a power is, and hence their role. |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Something very much like mental intentionality is a pervasive and ineliminable feature of the physical world. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I like this, because it offers a continuous account of mind and world. The idea that intentionality is some magic ingredient that marks off a non-physical type of reality is nonsense. See Fodor's attempts to reduce intentionality. |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: I propose a generalization: that all dispositional and extrinsic predicates that apply to an object, do so by virtue of intrinsic powers borne by the object. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the 'powers' view of nature, and the one with which I agree. An interesting question is whether powers or objects are more basic in our ontology. Are objects just collections of causal powers? What has the power? |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Some powers are grounded and some are not. ...All derivative powers ultimately derive from ungrounded powers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 8.5.2) | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to use the term 'property' for the derivative powers, reserving 'power' for something which is basic. Molnar makes a plausible case, though. |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: In the Standard Model of physics the fundamental physical magnitudes are represented as ones whose whole nature is exhausted by the dispositionality, ..so there is a strong presumption that the properties of subatomic particles are powers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 8.4.3) | |
| A reaction: A very nice point, because it asserts not merely that we should revise our metaphysic to endorse powers, but that we are actually already operating with exactly that view, in so far as we are physicalist. |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Dispositions can be causes. What is not actual cannot be a cause or any part of a cause. Merely possible events are not actual, and that makes them causally impotent. The claim that powers are causally potent has strong initial plausibility. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 5) | |
| A reaction: [He credits Mellor 1974 for this idea] He will need to show how dispositions can be causes (other than, presumably, being anticipated or imagined by conscious minds), which he says he will do in Ch. 12. |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Two arguments against Megaran Actualism are that it turns powers into nomads: they come and go, depending on whether they are being exercised or not. And it stops us from distinguishing between unexercised powers and absent powers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 4.3.1) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 11938 for Megaran Actualism. Molnar takes these objections to be fairly decisive, but if the Megarans are denying the existence of latent powers, they aren't going to be bothered by nomadism or the lack of distinction. |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: We understand less after a platonic explanation of universals than we understand before it was given. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: That pretty much sums up my view, and it pretty well sums up my view of religion as well. I thought I understood what numbers were until Frege told me that they were abstract objects, some sort of higher-order set. |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: For the nominalist, belonging to the extension of a predicate is just an inexplicable ultimate fact. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: I sometimes think of myself as a nominalist, but when it is summarised in Molnar's way I back off. He seem to be offering a third way, between platonic realism and nominalism. It is physical essentialist realism, I think. |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: A nominalist will only countenance first-order logic. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is because nominalist will not acknowledge properties as entities to be quantified over. Plural quantification seems to be a strategy for extending first-order logic while retaining nominalist sympathies. |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Structural properties are clear examples of derivative properties. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is an important question in the debate. Presumably you can't just reduce structural properties to more basic ones, because one set of basic properties might appear in many different structures. Ellis defends structural properties in metaphysics. |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: There are no 'structural properties', if by that we mean a property that has properties as parts. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 9.1.2) | |
| A reaction: There do seem to be properties that result from arranging more basic properties in one way rather than another (e.g. arranging the metal in a knife to be 'sharp'). But I think Molnar is right that they are not part of basic ontology. |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Pre-theoretically it does not seem to be the case that what is essential to a thing includes everything that is necessarily true of that thing. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to be true. The simple point, which I take to be obvious, is that essential properties must at the very least be in some way important, whereas necessities can be trivial. I favour the idea that the essences create the necessities. |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: What is the nature of the truthmaker for 'It is possible that p' in cases where p itself is false? | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.2.2) | |
| A reaction: Molnar mentions three views: there is a different type of being for possibilia (Meinong), or possibilia exist, or possibilia are merely represented. The third view is obviously correct, though I presume possibilia to be based on actual powers. |
| 4421 | Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Both the earliest and most recent philosophers are all oblivious of how much the will to truth itself first requires justification: here there is a gap in every philosophy - how did this come about? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§24) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a meta-philosophical question which will lead off into (quite interesting) cultural studies and (trite) evolutionary theory. Truth isn't a value, it is the biological function of brains. |
| 23719 | Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Forgetfulness is not just a vis inertiae, as superficial people believe, but is rather an active ability to suppress, positive in the strongest sense of the word. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§01) | |
| A reaction: It is unimpressive when people remember small slights and grievances for a long time - and even being owed small sums - so the ability to forget such things is admirable. But wilfully forgetting some things is obviously shameful. |
| 4420 | There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing", and the more different eyes we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", be. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12) | |
| A reaction: A very perceptive statement of the most plausible and sophisticated version of relativism. It is hard to see how we could distinguish multiple viewpoints from pure objectivity. |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: In his 'shade of blue' example, Hume is (sensibly) endorsing a type of reasoning - interpolation - that is widely used by rational thinkers. Too bad that interpolation and extrapolation are incurably invalid. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 7.2.3) | |
| A reaction: Interpolation and extrapolation are two aspects of inductive reasoning which contribute to our notion of best explanation. Empiricism has to allow at least some knowledge which goes beyond strict direct experience. |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: There have only been two serious proposals for distinguishing mind from matter. One appeals to intentionality, as per Brentano and his medieval precursors. The other, harking back to Descartes, Locke and empiricism, uses the capacity for consciousness. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 3.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Personally I take both of these to be reducible, and hence have no place for 'minds' in my ontology. Focusing on Chalmers's 'Hard Question' was the shift from the intentionality view to the consciousness view which is now more popular. |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Contrary to the Brentano Thesis, physical powers, such as solubility or electromagnetic charge, also have that direction toward something outside themselves that is typical of psychological attributes. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: I think this decisively undermines any strong thesis that 'intentionality is the mark of the mental'. I take thought to be just a fancy development of the physical powers of the physical world. |
| 4414 | Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The philosophers invented "free will" - absolute human spontaneity in good and evil - to furnish a right to the idea that the interest of the gods in man, in human virtue, could never be exhausted. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§07) | |
| A reaction: Wonderfully outrageous suggestion! If we had true metaphysical 'absolute' free will, we would be much more interesting, and have a much higher status in the cosmos. Nietzsche is probably right. |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Rule occasionalists (Arnauld, Bayle) say that on their view the results of God's action are the nomic regularities of nature, and not a miracle. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly more plausible that Malebranche's idea that God constantly intervenes. I take it as a nice illustration of the fact that 'laws of nature' were mainly invented by us to explain how God could control his world. Away with them! |
| 4419 | People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Whoever thinks in words thinks as an orator and not as a thinker (it shows that he does not think facts, but only in relation to facts). | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§08) | |
| A reaction: Good. It is certainly not true that we have to think in words, or else animals wouldn't think. Good thinking should focus on reality, and be too fast for words to keep up. |
| 4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for a 'action', so they separate strength from expressions of strength, but there is no such substratum; the deed is everything. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
| A reaction: Of course, there is no reason why an analysis should not separate the doer and the deed (to explain, for example, a well-meaning fool), but it is a blunder to think of a human action as a merely physical event. |
| 3793 | We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We need a critique of moral values; the value of these values themselves must just be called in question. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pre f§3) | |
| A reaction: But we must start somewhere with values, to avoid an infinite regress. |
| 4408 | The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The judgement 'good' did not first originate with those to whom goodness was shown! Rather it was the 'good' themselves, that is to say the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded who established themselves and their action as good. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02) | |
| A reaction: This may be right, but not very profound. Virtually all concepts are created by the most educated classes. The first recipient of charity may not have had the concept, but they would have been gobsmacked by the novelty. |
| 23716 | A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds seriously for long - that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of power. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§10) | |
| A reaction: An aspect of the 'higher man' that I don't recall being mentioned elsewhere. I basically approve of this, if it means not holding grudges, and living for the future rather than for the past. |
| 20129 | All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Every animal instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors ...every hindrance that obstructs this path to the optimum. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§07) | |
| A reaction: This became the lynchpin of Nietzsche's account of the source of values. It is a highly naturalistic view, fitting it into evolutionary theory (thought running deeper than that), so I have a lot of sympathy with the view. |
| 4409 | Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It was only when aristocratic value judgements declined that the whole antithesis of "egoistic" and "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02) | |
| A reaction: But Aristotle, who is no aristocrat, has a balanced and sensible view of 'egoism', where it isn't the patronising arrogance that Nietzsche seems to like, but a proper concern with one's own character. |
| 3259 | Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche's rejection of impersonal morality is an assertion of the dominance of the ideal of living well. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I) by Thomas Nagel - The View from Nowhere X.2 |
| 4416 | Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Justice on the elementary level is good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§08) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints a key problem with the social contract as a moral theory - that it requires equals, and recognises only terror of superiors, and indifference to useless inferiors who have nothing to offer (paraplegics and animals). |
| 4418 | A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: He who can command, he who is "master", he who is violent in act and bearing - what has he to do with contracts! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§17) | |
| A reaction: The persistent problem with social contract theory is that those much stronger or much weaker seem to have no interest in morality at all, and yet they can all have standards of behaviour. |
| 4407 | Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant are four spirits very different from one another, but united in one thing: their low estimation of pity. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pref §5) | |
| A reaction: Plato is no surprise, as virtually no Greeks value pity. Spinoza and Kant are interesting. Presumably Kant's 'contractualism' places respect far above pity, and is theoretical neglect of animals would fit. Remember Nietzsche embraced a horse in Turin. |
| 4415 | Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, between creditor and debtor. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§08) | |
| A reaction: In other words, lofty Kantian ideals started life in the grubby world of the Hobbesian social contract, and self-seeking has been disguised by idealism. Too harsh on Kant, who explains why contracts have force, not just convenience. |
| 23718 | If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Scientists …do not defend any belief more strongly than that the strong are free to be weak, and the birds of prey are free to be lambs: - in this way, they gain the right to make the birds of prey responsible for being birds of prey. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
| A reaction: This is a flat rejection of the Sartrean idea that we can what sort of person we want to be. He cares about birds of prey, but also lambs can't become eagles. I would say that adolescents have a reasonable degree of choice about what they will become. |
| 23717 | Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The sight of man now makes us tired - what is nihilism today if it is not that? …We are tired of man… | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§12) | |
| A reaction: That is close to Hume's nihilist, who would destroy the world to protect his own finger from a scratch. The actor George Sanders committed suicide because he was bored. Don't ever think that Nietzsche was a nihilist, just because he mentions it a lot! |
| 23721 | Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Within the original tribal association the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation towards the earlier generation, and in particular towards the earliest. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§19) | |
| A reaction: This is still a factor in modern politics, though the people remember are either military heroes or the great figures of a particular political movement. We remember the big artists and personalities, but don't feel obligated to them. |
| 20142 | The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Some pack of blond beasts of prey, on a war footing, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace which is shapeless. In this way the 'state' began on earth. I think I have dispensed with the fantasy which has it begin with a 'contract'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§17) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly likely that a tribe which got itself well organised and focused on some end would achieve total dominance over other tribes that just focus on food. |
| 23720 | Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: On the whole, punishment makes men harder and colder, it concentrates, it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power to resist. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§14) | |
| A reaction: If the school system involves routine harsh punishments, that means that the whole population ends up in that state. I would have thought that this was an obvious truth about punishment, but no one seems to want to face up to it. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: I take for granted the primacy of singular causation. A singular causal state of affairs is not constituted by a generalization. 'Aspirin relieves headache' is made true by 'This/that aspirin relieves this/that headache'. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Tooley for the opposite view] I wholly agree with Molnar, and am inclined to link it with the primacy of individual essences over kind essences. |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Causal analyses of powers pre-empt the correct account of causation in terms of powers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 4.2.3) | |
| A reaction: I think this is my preferred view. The crucial point is that powers are active, so one is not needing to add some weird 'causation' ingredient to a world which would otherwise be passive and inert. That is a relic from the interventions of God. |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: We should give up any causal analysis of powers, ..so we should try to analyse causation in terms of powers. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 8.5.3) | |
| A reaction: It may be hard to explain what powers are, or identify them, if you can't say that they cause things to happen. I am torn between Molnar's view, and the view that causation is primitive. |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The counterfactual analysis is open to the Euthyphro objection: it is causal dependence that explains any counterfactual dependence rather than vice versa. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1) | |
| A reaction: I take views like the counterfactual analysis of causation to arise from empiricists who are bizarrely reluctant to adopt plausible best explainations (such as powers and essences). |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Investigations premissed on the assumption that natural kinds have essences, that in particular the fundamental natural kinds have only essential intrinsic properties, tend to be practically successful because the assumption is true. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 11.3) | |
| A reaction: The point is made against a pragmatist approach to the problem by Nancy Cartwright. I take the starting point for scientific essentialism to be an empirical observation, that natural kinds seem to be very very stable. See Idea 8153. |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Molnar argues that some properties are non-powers, and he cites spatial location, spatial orientation, and temporal location. | |
| From: report of George Molnar (Powers [1998], 158-62) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 11.4 | |
| A reaction: Although you might say an event happened 'because' of an item on this list, this doesn't feel right to me. The ability to arrest someone is a power, but being at the scene of the crime isn't. It's an opportunity for a power. |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: The muon has mass 106.2 MeV, unit negative charge, and spin a half. The electron and tauon have unit negative charge, but electrons are 200 times less massive, and tauons 17 times more massive. Its essential properties are not mutually entailing. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This rejects a popular idea of scientific essentialism, that the essence is the set of properties which entail the non-essential properties (and not vice versa), a view which I had hitherto found rather appealing. |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: It is a contingent matter that the world contains the exact natural kinds it does, and hence it is a contingent matter that it contains the very powers it does. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 10.3) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be correct (for all we know). It would be daft to claim that the regularities of the universe are necessarily that way, but it is not daft to say that the stuff of the universe necessitates the pattern of what happens. |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: What powers there are does not depend on what laws there are, but vice versa, what laws obtain in the world is a function of what powers are to be found in that world. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.5) | |
| A reaction: This old idea may well be the most important realisation of modern times. I take the 'law' view to be based on a religious view of the world (see Idea 5470). There is still room to believe in a divine creator of the bewildering underlying powers. |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
| Full Idea: We know that all energy fields are discontinuous below the distance measured by Planck's constant h. The physical world ultimately consists of discrete objects. | |
| From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This is where quantum theory clashes with relativity, since the latter holds space to be a continuum. I'm not sure about Molnar's use of the word 'objects' here. |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |
| 4410 | The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The truly great haters in world history have always been priests. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§07) | |
| A reaction: Wicked, but it has a lot of truth. Priests have a lot to defend, and a lot of reasons for feeling threatened. |