8865
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If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
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Full Idea:
If someone says 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', he or she wants to focus on Democrats, not numbers. If the number is 50 million, is 50 million really on the rise?
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From:
Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §14)
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A reaction:
This is a very nice warning from Yablo, against easy platonism, or any sort of platonism at all. We routinely say that numbers are 'increasing', but the real meaning needs entangling. Here it refers to people joining a party.
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8864
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We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
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Full Idea:
It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally.
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From:
Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13)
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A reaction:
Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of?
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14330
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To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
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Full Idea:
It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions.
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From:
David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI)
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A reaction:
It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active.
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8858
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Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
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Full Idea:
There's a tradition in philosophy of finding 'unexpected objects' in truth-conditions, such as countermodels, possible worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets and properties.
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From:
Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §02)
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A reaction:
This is a very nice perspective on the whole matter of abstract objects. If we find ourselves reluctantly committed to the existence of something which is ontologically peculiar, we should go back to the philosophical drawing-board.
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6498
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Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
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Full Idea:
According to D.M. Armstrong and others, when we perceive secondary qualities we are in fact perceiving primary qualities in a confused, indistinct or blurred way.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 270-90) by Howard Robinson - Perception III.1
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A reaction:
This is obviously an attempt to fit secondary qualities into a reductive physicalist account of the mind. Personally I favour Armstrong's project, but doubt whether this strategy is necessary. I just don't think there is anything 'primary' about redness.
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5690
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A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
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Full Idea:
For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection
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A reaction:
I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible).
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5493
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If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
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Full Idea:
Armstrong and Lewis said that mental items were defined in terms of typical causes and effects; if, as seems likely, research reveals that a particular causal niche is occupied by a physical state, it follows that pain is a physical state.
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From:
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.5
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A reaction:
I am not fully convinced of the first step in the argument. It sounds like the epistemology and the ontology have got muddled (as usual). We define mental states as we define electrons, in terms of observed behaviour, but what are they?
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