Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Theory of Universals' and 'Morals and Modals'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Armstrong says what is actual (namely a certain roster of universals) might have been impossible. Hence his modal logic is S4, without the 'Brouwersche Axiom'.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by David Lewis - Armstrong on combinatorial possibility 'The demand'
     A reaction: So p would imply possibly-not-possibly-p.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
     Full Idea: Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3
     A reaction: At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
     Full Idea: Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1
     A reaction: I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though!
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
     Full Idea: Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
     A reaction: Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness.
     From: David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6
     A reaction: At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
     Full Idea: Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23
     A reaction: This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
     Full Idea: Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11
     A reaction: This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14629 If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
     Full Idea: If we ask why A must be the case, and A is then proved from B, that explains it if B must be so. If the eventual source cites some truth F, then if F just is so, there is strong pressure to feel that the original necessity has not been explained.
     From: Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] Ross Cameron wrote a reply to this which I like. I'm fishing for the idea that essence is the source of necessity (as Kit Fine says), but that essence itself is not necessary (as only I say, apparently!).
14529 If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
     Full Idea: Blackburn asks of what theorists propose as underlying the necessity of a proposition, the question whether they themselves are conceived as obtaining of necessity or merely contingently.
     From: report of Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], p.120-1) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 1
     A reaction: I've seen a reply to this somewhere: I think the thought was that a necessity wouldn't be any less necessary if it had a contingent source, any more than the father of a world champion boxer has to be a world champion boxer.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.