Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A World of States of Affairs' and 'The Architecture of Mathematics'

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8 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: In Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory, the truth-making relation is not one-one, but one-many or many-one. Thus 'p or q' has two truth makers, p and q.
     From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.129), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1
     A reaction: Interesting. Armstrong deals in universals. He also cites many swans as truth-makers for 'there is a least one black swan'. Not correspondence as we know it, Jim.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics is a storehouse of abstract structures [Bourbaki]
     Full Idea: From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears as a storehouse of abstract forms - the mathematical structures.
     From: Nicholas Bourbaki (The Architecture of Mathematics [1950], 221-32), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.79
     A reaction: This seems to be the culmination of the structuralist view that developed from Dedekind and Hilbert, and was further developed by philosophers in the 1990s.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Armstrong has difficulty explaining how laws entail regularities. There is no real modality in the basic components of the world, but he wants to support counterfactuals. His official position is a kind of fictionalism.
     From: comment on David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], 49-51) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 4.4.4
     A reaction: Armstrong seems to be up against the basic problems that laws won't explain anything if they are merely regularities (assuming they are not decrees of a supernatural force).
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Armstrong has a distinctive conception of (fundamental) properties as contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by David Lewis - A world of truthmakers? p.220
     A reaction: Armstrong tries to get a naturalistically founded platonism (which he claims is Aristotelian), but the idea that one thing can be multiply located strikes me as daft (especially if the number of its locations increases or decreases).
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth.
     From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.115), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1
     A reaction: Armstrong's 'truth-make principle'. It seems to be a necessity which is neither natural nor analytic, making it metaphysically necessary. Or is it part of the definition of truth?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §6.3.3
     A reaction: Obviously logical necessity is not causal, but as a proposal for simplifying accounts of necessity in nature, this is wonderfully simple and appealing. Is his proposal an elevation of causation, or a degradation of necessity?
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.