26 ideas
| 10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: For a set to be 'well-ordered' it is required that every subset of the set has a first element. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
| 10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
| 10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: The idea of the 'power set' means that it is always possible to generate a bigger one using only the elements of that set, namely the set of all its subsets. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14) |
| 10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Extension: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
| 10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong. So you can make a set out of two other sets. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
| 10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Unions: For every collection of sets there exists a set that contains all the elements that belong to at least one of the sets in the collection. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
| 10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: There exists a set containing the empty set and the successor of each of its elements. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
| A reaction: This is rather different from the other axioms because it contains the notion of 'successor', though that can be generated by an ordering procedure. |
| 10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Powers: For each set there exists a collection of sets that contains amongst its elements all the subsets of the given set. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
| A reaction: Obviously this must include the whole of the base set (i.e. not just 'proper' subsets), otherwise the new set would just be a duplicate of the base set. |
| 10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Choice: For every set we can provide a mechanism for choosing one member of any non-empty subset of the set. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
| A reaction: This axiom is unusual because it makes the bold claim that such a 'mechanism' can always be found. Cohen showed that this axiom is separate. The tricky bit is choosing from an infinite subset. |
| 10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set. This may be the empty set, but you need to start with something. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
| 10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Specification: For every set and every condition, there corresponds a set whose elements are exactly the same as those elements of the original set for which the condition is true. So the concept 'number is even' produces a set from the integers. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
| A reaction: What if the condition won't apply to the set? 'Number is even' presumably won't produce a set if it is applied to a set of non-numbers. |
| 10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Three views of mathematics: 'pure' mathematics, where it doesn't matter if it could ever have any application; 'real' mathematics, where every concept must be physically grounded; and 'applied' mathematics, using the non-real if the results are real. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.17) | |
| A reaction: Very helpful. No one can deny the activities of 'pure' mathematics, but I think it is undeniable that the origins of the subject are 'real' (rather than platonic). We do economics by pretending there are concepts like the 'average family'. |
| 10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: You can think of an ordinal number as being defined by the set that comes before it, so, in the non-negative integers, ordinal 5 is defined as {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
| 10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: With ordinary finite numbers ordinals and cardinals are in effect the same, but beyond infinity it is possible for two sets to have the same cardinality but different ordinals. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
| 10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: The 'transcendental numbers' are those irrationals that can't be fitted to a suitable finite equation, of which π is far and away the best known. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6) |
| 10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: The realisation that brought 'i' into the toolkit of physicists and engineers was that you could extend the 'number line' into a new dimension, with an imaginary number axis at right angles to it. ...We now have a 'number plane'. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.12) |
| 10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: It is a chicken-and-egg problem, whether the lack of zero forced forced classical mathematicians to rely mostly on a geometric approach to mathematics, or the geometric approach made 0 a meaningless concept, but the two remain strongly tied together. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6) |
| 10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: As far as Kronecker was concerned, Cantor had built a whole structure on the irrational numbers, and so that structure had no foundation at all. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
| 10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Paul Cohen showed that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
| 10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
| Full Idea: The 'continuum hypothesis' says that aleph-one is the cardinality of the rational and irrational numbers. | |
| From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14) |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics seems necessary because the real contents of mathematical statements are logical truths, which are necessary, and it seems a priori because logical truths really are a priori. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 10) | |
| A reaction: Yablo says his logicism has a Kantian strain, because numbers and sets 'inscribed on our spectacles', but he takes a different view (in the present Idea) from Kant about where the necessity resides. Personally I am tempted by an a posteriori necessity. |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Saying 'the number of Fs is 5', instead of using five quantifiers, puts the numeral in quantifiable position, which brings expressive advantages. 'There are more sheep in the field than cows' is an infinite disjunction, expressible in finite compass. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 08) | |
| A reaction: See Hofweber with similar thoughts. This idea I take to be a key one in explaining many metaphysical confusions. The human mind just has a strong tendency to objectify properties, relations, qualities, categories etc. - for expression and for reasoning. |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Objects like me have a few essential properties, and numerous accidental ones. Abstract objects are a different story. The intrinsic properties of the empty set are mostly essential. The relations of numbers are also mostly essential. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 01) | |
| A reaction: There's a shift here, from his own 'properties' to the 'intrinsic properties' of the abstracta. Presumably his own 'intrinsic' properties are not accidental. In fact, intrinsic properties tend to be essential properties, I think. |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: Our knowledge of concreta is a posteriori, but our knowledge of numbers, at least, has often been considered a priori. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Abstract Objects: a Case Study [2002], 02) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think numbers are rooted in experience, though pure arithmetic has travelled a long way since it started. I doubt whether arithmetic is possible without counting things. I don't think I believe in the 'pure' a priori. |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
| From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |