8 ideas
21855 | Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord] |
Full Idea: It was not until the 1780s that it became acceptable to read the works of Spinoza, and even then it was not without a frisson of danger. | |
From: Beth Lord (Spinoza's Ethics [2010], Intro 'Who?') | |
A reaction: Hence we hear of Wordsworth and Coleridge reading him with excitement. So did Kant read him? |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
Full Idea: No two classes have exactly the same members, but two different attributes may be attributes of exactly the same things. Classes are identical when their members are identical. ...On the other hand, attributes have no clear principle of individuation. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.100) |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
Full Idea: May we not say that you know an attribute only insofar as you know what things have it? | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.106) | |
A reaction: Simple, and the best defence of class nominalism (a very implausible theory) which I have encountered. Do I have to know all the things? Do I not know 'red' if I don't know tomatoes have it? |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
Full Idea: We have an acceptable notion of class, or physical object, or attribute, or any other sort of object, only insofar as we have an acceptable principle of individuation for that sort of object. There is no entity without identity. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.102) | |
A reaction: Note that this is his criterion for an 'acceptable' notion. Presumably that is for science. It permits less acceptable notions which don't come up to the standard. And presumably true things can be said about the less acceptable entities. |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
Full Idea: Physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Individuation of Attributes [1975], p.101) | |
A reaction: The supposed counterexample to this is the statue and the clay it is made of, which are said to have different modal properties (destroying the statue doesn't destroy the clay). |
21866 | Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord] |
Full Idea: 'Conatus' [translated as 'striving' by Curley] is used by early modern philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes (a major influence of Spinoza), to express the notion of a thing's endeavour for what is advantageous to it. It drives all things in nature. | |
From: Beth Lord (Spinoza's Ethics [2010], p.88) | |
A reaction: I think it is important to connect conatus to Nietzsche's talk of a plurality of 'drives', which are an expression of the universal will to power (which is seen even in the interactions of chemistry). Conatus is also in Leibniz. |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3 |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime. | |
From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea. |