9217
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Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
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Full Idea:
The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
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From:
M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
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A reaction:
I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.
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16045
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General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
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Full Idea:
Russell noted that you cannot arrive at general facts by inference from numerous particular facts, ..but general facts logically supervene on particular ones. So the general facts supervene, but are not entailed.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Karen Bennett - Supervenience §3.2
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A reaction:
The belief that the general facts supervene on the particular ones then seems to be more a matter of faith than of fact. Or maybe it is analytic, depending on what we understand by 'general'. Universal, or generalised?
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