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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Prior Analytics' and 'Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault]
     Full Idea: In its critical aspect, philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.300)
     A reaction: A very French view of the subject. It is tempting to say that they had their adolescent outburst in 1789, and it is time to grow up. With rights come responsibilities...
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault]
     Full Idea: The relationship between philosophy and politics is permanent and fundamental.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.293)
     A reaction: This idea is one of the biggest gulfs between continental and analytical philosophy. Many aspects of philosophy are turning out to be much more social than analytical philosophers might have thought - epistemology, for example.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
     Full Idea: Plutarch says if you have mastered principles then logos will silence your desires like a master silencing a dog - in which case the logos functions without intervention on your part - you have become the logos, or the logos has become you.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.286)
     A reaction: If you believe that logos is pure reason, you might be quite happy with this, but if you thought it was a cultural construct, you might feel that you had been cunningly enslaved. If I ask 'what is 7+6?', logos interrupts me to give the answer.
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
     Full Idea: It was Aristotle who initiated the use of the letter of the (Greek) alphabet 'schematically', to stand for an unspecified piece of language of some appropriate grammatical type.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Aris'
     A reaction: Did he invent it from scratch, or borrow it from the mathematicians? Euclid labels diagrams with letters.
Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's logic is based on the triadic syllogism, the distinction between subject and one-place predicates, that universal claims have existential commitment, and bivalence, excluded middle and noncontradiction.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 2.2
Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle there are four formatives for sentences: 'belongs to some', 'belongs to every', 'belongs to no', and 'does not belong to every'. These are 'copulae'. Aristotle would have written 'wise belongs to some man'.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
     A reaction: A rather set-theoretic reading. This invites a Quinean scepticism about whether wisdom is some entity which can 'belong' to a person. It makes trope theory sound attractive, offering a unique wisdom that is integrated into that particular person.
Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Aristotle identified four 'figures' of argument, based on combinations of Subject (S) and Predicate (P) and Middle term (M). The addition of 'all' and 'some', and 'has' and 'has not' got the property, resulted in 256 possible syllogisms, 19 of them valid.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: [Compressed version of Devlin] What Aristotle did was astonishing, and must be one of the key ideas of western civilization, even though a lot of his assumptions have been revised or rejected.
Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
     Full Idea: Aristotle replaced the Platonic noun-verb account of logical syntax with a 'copular' account. A sentence is a pair of terms bound together logically (not necessarily grammatically) by one of four 'logical copulae' (every, none, some, not some).
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C - Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics 8
     A reaction: So the four copulas are are-all, are-never, are-sometimes, and are-sometime-not. Consider 'men' and 'mortal'. Alternatively, Idea 18909.
Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Aristotle listed a total of nineteen syllogisms involved in logical reasoning, though some of the ones on his list were subsequently shown to be invalid.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], Ch.1) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes
     A reaction: It is quite upsetting to think that the founding genius got some of it wrong, but that just shows how subtle and complex the analysis of rational thought can be.
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's system accepted as correct some laws which nowadays we reject, for example |= (Some Fs are G) or (some Fs are not G). He failed to take into account the possibility of there being no Fs at all.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by David Bostock - Intermediate Logic 8.4
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Since to belong, to belong of necessity, and to be possible to belong are different, ..there will be different deductions for each; one deduction will be from necessary terms, one from terms which belong, and one from possible terms.
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 29b29-35)
     A reaction: Fitting and Mendelsohn cite this as the earliest thoughts on modal logic. but Kneale and Kneale say that Aristotle got into a muddle, and so was unable to create a workable system.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so.
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24b18)
     A reaction: Notice that it is modal ('suppose', rather than 'know'), that necessity is involved, which is presumably metaphysical necessity, and that there are assumptions about what would be true, and not just what follows from what.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
     Full Idea: Aristotle often preferred to formulate predications by placing the terms at opposite ends of the sentence and joining them by predicating expressions like 'belongs-to-some' or 'belongs-to-every'.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography 'Conceptions'
     A reaction: This is Sommers's picture of Aristotle, which led Sommers to develop his modern Term Logic.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Basic to Aristotle's logic is the grammatical distinction between subject and predicate, which he glosses in terms of the contrast between a substance and its properties.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro
     A reaction: The introduction of quantifiers and 'logical form' can't disguise the fact that we still talk about (and with) objects and predicates, because no one can think of any other way to talk.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate. Belonging 'to every/to none' is universal; belonging 'to some/not to some/not to every' is particular; belonging or not belonging (without universal/particular) is indeterminate.
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24a16)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
     Full Idea: Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some'), and two ways to combine the subject with the predicate ('have', and 'have not'), giving four propositions: all-s-have-p, all-s-have-not-p, some-s-have-p, and some-s-have-not-p.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
     A reaction: Frege seems to have switched from 'some' to 'at-least-one'. Since then other quantifiers have been proposed. See, for example, Ideas 7806 and 6068.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It sometimes results that the deduction becomes necessary when only one of the premises is necessary (not whatever premise it might be, however, but only the premise in relation to the major extreme [premise]).
     From: Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 30a15)
     A reaction: The qualification is brackets is said by Plantinga (1969) to be a recognition of the de re/ de dicto distinction (later taken up by Aquinas). Plantinga gives two examples to illustrate his reading.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
     Full Idea: When I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of truth are just concealed power relations - that would be a horrible exaggeration.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.296)
     A reaction: I take this to be a denial of the more absurd forms of relativism. I think there is an interesting convergence between this kind of continental thinking, and the social view of justification found in the later work of Alvin Goldman.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
     Full Idea: According to Aristotle, the terms of a language form a finite hierarchy, where the higher terms are predicable of more things than are lower terms.
     From: report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
     A reaction: I would be a bit cautious about placing something precisely in a hierarchy according to how many things it can be predicated of. It is a start, though, in trying to give a decent account of generality, which is a major concept in philosophy.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault]
     Full Idea: The subject is not a substance but a form, which is not always identical to itself. You do not have the same relation to yourself when you go to vote and when you seek to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.290)
     A reaction: I don't think I believe this. If it were true, the concept of 'sexual politics' would mean nothing to me. A brutal or sympathetic nature is likely to express itself in both situations.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault]
     Full Idea: What is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] practice of freedom?
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.284)
     A reaction: Makes Foucault sound very existentialist. I'm not sure I understand this kind of remark, given that serial killers seem to be exceptionally good at 'practising their freedom'. However, the idea is akin to Kant's notion of a truly good will (Idea 3710).
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
     Full Idea: The problem is not to dissolve power relations in a utopia of transparent communications, but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, the morality, the practice of the self, that allows games of power with minimum domination.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.298)
     A reaction: If you are a democrat it is hard to disagree with this, though I am still unclear why being dominated should rank as a total disaster. A healthy personal relationship might involve domination. 'Management techniques' is interesting.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
     Full Idea: I am somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there is a human nature, that has been concealed or alienated by mechanisms of repression.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.282)
     A reaction: Personally I think there is (to some extent) a human nature, and that it fails to flourish if it gets too much 'liberation. However, the world contains a lot more repression than liberation, so we should all be fans of liberty.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
     Full Idea: Archelaus wrote that life on Earth began in a primeval slime.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Malcolm Schofield - Archelaus
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly clearcut assertion of the production of life by evolution. Darwin's contribution was to propose the mechanism for achieving it. We should honour the name of Archelaus for this idea.