Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Naming and Necessity lectures' and 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'
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32 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
23466
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Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
23467
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Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
17647
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Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
15851
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Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
23468
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Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15846
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In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16995
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Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
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17047
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If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
15849
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Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
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15850
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Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13259
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It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
5450
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For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17055
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Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
16997
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An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
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17045
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De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22321
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To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
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17030
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Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
16955
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Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
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16996
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Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13971
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Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
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12100
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An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16991
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No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11867
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If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
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12018
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Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
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17046
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Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
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8274
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Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
6056
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Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
22322
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You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
6057
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Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15847
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Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
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17036
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Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
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17038
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If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
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