Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Individuals without Sortals' and 'Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature'
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18 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
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17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
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17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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15851
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Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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15846
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In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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15849
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Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
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15850
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Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13259
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It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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15847
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Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
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