Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Against Barbaric physics' and 'How Things Persist'

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32 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
16232 An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
15851 Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
16200 Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16237 The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley]
16238 Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
16220 Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
16222 Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15846 In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16228 The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
16229 Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
14492 If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
15849 Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
15850 Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13259 It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
16193 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
16195 Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
16202 The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
16192 Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley]
16196 Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16197 How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley]
16191 Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley]
16199 If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley]
16201 Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley]
16240 If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16206 Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley]
16203 Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley]
16204 Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley]
16212 An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley]
16213 Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
16205 The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15847 Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16225 If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]