Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Letters to Hegel' and 'The Principles of Mathematics'

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13 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
7781 I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14166 Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
14164 The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
15851 Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
14112 A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15846 In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
15849 Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
15850 Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13259 It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14170 Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15847 Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
14107 Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
11849 It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]