Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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13 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
15851 Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
12134 Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15846 In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
15849 Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
15850 Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13259 It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
16572 Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
16573 Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
13214 The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
13215 If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15847 Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]