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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' and 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)'

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87 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
12499 Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
1211 Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
12508 Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
11900 We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
11870 Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
12506 A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke]
12563 Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11866 The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
12529 I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
8546 Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
1196 We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
12536 We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7945 We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
12485 We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
16796 Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
14744 Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
12507 A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
14749 Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12559 Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
12498 Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
12520 The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
13771 Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
16038 Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
12810 We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
16786 You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
15992 Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12530 The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke]
12532 Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke]
12539 If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12510 Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke]
11155 Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
12560 We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16787 Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
16028 Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
12305 Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
15985 It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
12534 We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
11879 Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
13434 In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
16035 If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
16036 Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12540 Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
16031 Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
15646 If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
12306 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
15988 The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
15644 In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
12537 To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
16029 Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
12531 Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
13433 Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
12533 Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
12557 Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
12561 For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
12525 The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
13431 A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
13423 The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12804 There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
12547 We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
12503 Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
11876 It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12505 One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
11858 The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
11831 The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
12504 Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
11839 Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
11845 Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]