Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Anti-essentialism' and 'New Essays on Human Understanding'

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12 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
12931 Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
12811 We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
5057 If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12884 The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
12805 If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
12806 Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]